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Rendleman: Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenille Court
PARENS PATRIAE: FROM CHANCERY TO
THE JUVENILE COURT
DOUGLAS

R.

RENDLEMAN*

INTRODUCTION

In this article I will trace through the nineteenth century the
progress and manners of what came to be the juvenile court. My
inquiry has been aided immensely by recent scholarship and the subject
matter has become of current interest because of recent constitutional
decisions. By knowing the origin and original scope of legal
institutions, we can appraise their present worth in terms of those
origins and the current understanding and expectation of society.
I take the position herein that the institution which came to be the
juvenile court was, in large part, a descendant of mechanisms,
definitions and dispositions developed in feudal England to deal with
poverty. It is currently fashionable to attack reformers and liberals and
I indulge in that pastime but, at the risk of seeming sentimental and
evolutionary, it seems to me that those liberals and reformers pruned
much of the bad and repaired much of the good. They did so, however,
within the frame of reference of their time; and although they were
additions and improvements, the outline, to me, is clear. Our society
because of cultural ethnocentrism and an unwillingness to admit that
poor people were entitled to full citizenship, continued to derogate
children's right to liberty and parent's right to custody. By calling the
statutes "protective" and by borrowing the idea of parens patriae the
reformers were able to state their task elegantly and to dazzle many
observers, in their time and ours. However, those terms, used as they
were, prevented the development of true protection and parenspatriae.
Thus, there is more than a little irony in my use of the words
"protective" and parenspatriae.

The issues raised herein are by no means solved. For almost one
hundred years it has been argued that social welfare policy tended to
break up families.' A disturbing phrase in a disturbing case 2 is
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law; BA,
MA, JD, U. of Iowa; Member Iowa Bar; LLM U. of Mich. Part of this research was
subsidized by a Cook fellowship at the University of Michigan Law School, and an
earlier draft of this paper was submitted as a part of an LLM program at that school.
1. Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wisc. 328,
330 (1876).
2. See generally Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare
Adjudication, 58 CAL. L. REv. 555 (1970).
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persuasive evidence that the makers of dominant ideology are still
unwilling to admit that family solidarity is important to poor people.
In response to the argument that maximum welfare grants tended to
break up families because children were worth more in welfare benefits
out of their parent's home than they were in it, the Supreme Court
justified the maximum grants by stating that "the kinship tie may be
attenuated but it cannot be destroyed." 3 As the dissents point out, this
result may indeed attenuate the family tie because the children, difficult
to support at any rate, are, in fact, worth more in another relative's
home. 4 Moreover, such an attitude may conceivably lead to the
complete destruction of family ties.5 In any event, the idea that poor
people are less entitled to family solidarity than the rest of society is a
slur on every impoverished family in the nation5 I
Before I begin the body of the paper, some discussion of
methodology is in order. Sources are hard to come by, especially those
dealing with "the short and simple annals of the poor." Rostovtzeff,
discussing the social and economic history of the Roman Empire
observed, "of the life led by the lower classes at this time we know
nothing; but it is unlikely that it was specially attractive." ' We know
very little about the life of the impoverished classes in our recent
history. We can study the legislation,' but while it tells us something
about the ambiance of the times, legislation in the absence of data
about its administration and effect, is sterile and lifeless.' Institutional
and organizational records, reports and proceedings are a form of
3. Dandridge v. Williams, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 1159 (1970); compare Dews v. Henry, 297
F. Supp. 587, 592 (D. Ariz. 1969); see Dienes, supra note 2 at 578-80.
4. 90 S. Ct. at 1170 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 90 S. Ct. at 1176 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
5. Cf.42 U.S.C. § 608 (1969); In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968).
5.1. See the comments of Mr. Justice Marshall in Wyman v. James arguing against
the majority position that welfare could be cut off because the recipient refused to allow a
government agent to enter her home: "Would the majority sanction, in the absence of
probable cause, compulsory visits to all American homes for the purpose of discovering
child abuse? Or is this Court prepared to hold as a matter of constitutional law that a
mother, merely because she is poor, is substantially more likely to injure or exploit her
children? Such a categorical approach to an entire class of citizens would be dangerously
at odds with the tenets of our democracy." Wyman v. James, 91 S. Ct. 381, 399
(dissenting opinion) (1971).
6. M. ROSTOVTZEFF, RoNE, Ch. XI IV 160 (Galexy ed., 1960).

7. See, e.g.,
as GILLIAN].
8. Cf. M.
AMERICA

GILLIAN, POOR RELIEF LEGISLATION IN IOWA

(1914) [hereinafter cited

JERIGAN, THE LABORING AND DEPENDENT CLASSES IN COLONIAL

157 (1960) [hereinafter cited as JERIGAN].
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access to the past which can profitably be explored,' but this approach

reflects the thoughts and aspirations of a certain segment of the middle
class. While such study may be a legitimate aspect of social and

intellectual history, the review of the records hardly holds "a mirror up
to nature" because it is one or more steps removed from the poor

themselves.
I have chosen to use statutes and decisions, in short "the law", less
for analysis than to show the situations of people and the response of

society through the legislatures and courts.I" My generalizations, to the
empiricist, are based on isolated and particular instances but in the
absence of empirical contradiction, I stand by them." The cynic may
well compare my data and conclusions to the data and conclusions of
others and agree with Henry Burlingame that: "History, in short, is

like those waterholes I have heard of in the wilds of Africa: the various
beasts may drink there side by side with equal nourishment.'

2

EARLY ENGLISH DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Chancery Courts
Previously, it was held by some, on what was thought to be good

authority, that the extension of the parens patriaedoctrine to children
came about when, because of a printer's error in an early case, the word

"enfant" was substituted for "ideot".

3

Later and more thorough

research, however, seems to have dispelled the idea that the goof was

committed by such a minor figure.
The doctrine of parenspatriaeas it developed in medieval and late
9. See R. PICKETr, HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGIN OF JUVENILE REFORM IN NEW YORK
STATE 1815-1857 (1969) (hereinafter cited as PICKETT).
10. Weyrauch, Dual Systems of Family Law. 457, 460 LAW OF THE POOR (J.
tenBroek ed., 1966).
11. There should be no reason to apologize. Statutes and lawsuits are the record of
historical fact. The statement of fact in opinions are facts found by an efficient system of
truthseeking and recorded, as reliable, for the use and enlightenment of posterity. The
decisions in the reported cases show how society solved that particular conflict and, we
assume from the operation of the rules of precedent, future conflicts. See D. FISCHER,
HISTORIAN'S FALLACIES 99-100 (1970). Nevertheless, there are questions: did the
legislation affect any people or did it repose innocuously on the books; did the litigation
concern a common problem or was it a single instance, an outrage or a freak; was the
decision followed or did the administrators ignore it? Id. at 104-05.
12. J. BARTH, THE SOT WEED FACTOR 515 (1966).
13. FOOTE, LEVY AND SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 394, n.13

(1966).
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medieval English chancery courts is traced in an excellent recent
article. 4 The state's interest in the welfare of children developed slowly
and in response to litigation. The litigation concerned feudal
relationships and the thrust of chancery power seems to have been a

series of attempts to assure the orderly transfer of feudal duties from
one generation to another and to insure that there would be someone to
perform these duties.' 5 Later, and perhaps subordinate to this role, the
courts of chancery began to prevent the victimization of vulnerable
parties by prohibiting litigation by anyone outside of the formal feudal
hierarchy." The major issues in the medieval cases concerned property,
guardianship and the arrangement of people, property, and power, in
relation to the monarchy. Rather than a roving commission to improve
parent-child relationships, chancery, as an agent of the monarchy, had
a duty to harmonize testimentary and guardianship problems in the
interest of order and hierarchy.
The cases of the poet Percy Shelley and Long Wellesley in the
early nineteenth century will complete our brief summary of the
English chancery law. Following the death of his wife Harriet and his
marriage to Mary, Shelley attempted to obtain the custody of his and
Harriet's children from Harriet's family, the Westbrooks. The
Westbrooks adduced the poem Queen Mab as evidence that Shelley
was an atheist. Other evidence introduced was Shelley's political tracts,
letters from Shelley to Harriet, and some of Shelley's less than
impeccable behavior with Harriet and Mary. Lord Chancellor Eldon
held that, because of the poet's behavior and expressed ideas, he could
not have custody of the children and the controversy was remanded to a
master for final resolution. 7
On the other hand, Long Wellesley was an outspoken and free
swinging aristocrat; and the scandalous behavior which was difficult to
14. Cogan, Juvenile Law Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriac",22
S.C.L. REv. 147 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Cogan].
15. Id. Cogan states "'Parenspatriae
was never used to legitimate an interest of the
king. Rather it was used to legitimate interests of the needy." Id. at 165. The feudal
hierarchy, I presume, would not work unless someone of competence occupied
intermediate positions and it was in the interest of the governing class for the positions to
be occupied. Thus, by aiding the "needy" or incompetent members of the hierarchy, the
ruling classes secured the competent performance of intermediate duties. My analysis

does not cover the chancery protection of charities which do not fit the pattern. (Id. at
161-63).
16. Id. at 151, 153.
17. Shelley v. Westbrook, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817).
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find in Shelley's case was open and palpable in Wellesley's. He was a
deadbeat, lived in open adultery, and was outspoken about his views. In

a lawsuit for custody between Wellesley and his deceased wife's
relatives, the courts, shocked at such conduct, refused to allow him to

resume custody."
These cases are frequently cited, 9 but their relevance to a study of
American law is far from clear. First, the idea of protective jurisdiction

through parenspatriaewas a part of the crown's power1° and, as I have
argued above, was used to maintain the structure of feudalism. 2 The

American revolution was a repudiation of the idea of monarchy and
feudalism; and the federal and state constitutions stand for the idea of
limited and popularly elected government. Chancery, in particular, was

held to be objectionable; and several of the new states refused to adopt
chancery jurisdiction because of its monarchial connotations.?2 Second,
these decisions were not precedent in the common law sense of the term.
After the revolution the new states "received" the English common law

in general terms,21 but with qualification. In some jurisdictions the
reception was only up to a certain date and the latest date given in 1776,
forty years before the decision in Shelley's case. 24 In other jurisdictions
the reception was only to the extent that English law was consistent
with and applicable to local conditions. 25 Third, both cases deal with

the expression of unpopular ideas. In Shelley v. Westbrook 6 the
publication of Queen Mab, an anti-religious poem, is one of the

grounds for the decision. To deprive a parent of his children because he
18. Wellesley v. The Duke of Beaufort, 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827); Wellesley v.
Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (H.L. 1828).
19. See, e.g., Foster and Freed, Child Custody. 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 423, 424 (1964);
Simpson, The Unfit Parent,39 U. DET. L.J. 347, 382 (1962).
20. See, e.g., Butler v. Freeman, 27 Eng. Rep. 204 (Ch. 1786).
21. Supra notes 15, 16.
22. P. CARRINGTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES & COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS OF
ADJUCIATION 29 (1969); 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 5658 (1335); Beale, Equity in America, I CAMBRIDGE L.J. 21, 21-24 (1923).
23. Kocourek, Sources of Law in the United States of North American and Their
Relation to Each Other, 18 A.B.A.J. 676, 677-78 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Kocourek].
24. Id.; Shelley v. Westbrook, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817); Bielsky v. Schulz, 16
Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105, 109-10 (1962). Limitations on the tort liability of
governmental bodies and manufacturers are additional doctrines developed in England
after the American Revolution which did a great deal of damage in the United States.
Fortunately, both are almost gone.
25. Kocourek, supra note 23, see also CODE OF ALABAMA, Title I § 3 (Recomp.
1958).
26. 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817).
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expresses unpopular and anti-religious ideas seems contrary to the first
amendment of the Federal Constitution and to the Bill of Rights in
most state constitutions. A decisive factor in Wellesley seems to have
been Wellesley's petulant declaration of family sovereignty: "there are
certain things which ought to be left alone, a man and his children
ought to be allowed to go the devil their own way, if he pleases." 2 In
effect this meant "no one can stop me." The House of Lords replied,
"We can." If Long Wellesley had kept his ideas to himself, I speculate
that the custody issue might have been decided differently. Fourth, and
I will extend this at length below, the English chancery cases which deal
with the aristocracy are not directly relevant to the development of the
juvenile court because, to a large extent, the juvenile court grew out of
the law of pauper control. The desultory effort of the courts of chancery
to socialize the wayward rich are important, but only because the cases
were cited as supporting state interference in intra-family affairs." The
ideas, the mechanism, and the means are to be found elsewhere.
B. Statutory Law
While chancery was struggling along case by case with the
property and custody problems of the rich, a statutory scheme which
dealt with the child custody of the poor had been developing. As a
response to the social and economic changes of the declining feudal age,
Parliament in 1562 passed the Statutes of Artificers" which provided,
among other things, that the children of pauper parents were to be
involuntarily separated from their parents and to be apprenticed to
others. The Poor Law Act of 16013 1 added to the system. Children
could be taken from pauper parents at the discretion of the overseers of
the poor; and the child was bound out to a local resident as an
apprentice until he reached full age.3 1In addition the statute established
27. Cf. 79 HARv. L. REV. 1710, 1715 (1966).
28. Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078, 1080, 1083 (H.L. 1828). Hal Painter
said, "I have decided Mark and myself would be better off if I went ahead with what I've
started and the hell with the rest, sink, swim or starve." The result is history. Painter v.
Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 1392, 140 N.W.2d 152, 155 (1966).
29. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
30. 5 ELIZ. c.4 (1562).
31. 43 ELIZ. c. 2 (1601).
32. See generally ten Broek, California'sDual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 274, 279-82 (1964). This three
16 STAN. L. REV. 900 (1964); III. 17 STAN. L.
part article, 1. 16 STAN. L. REv. 257; 11.
REv. 614 (1965) [hereinafter cited as tenBroek, Family Law followed by volume and
page.]
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forced labor for the able bodied and cash relief for those unable to
work.Y Blackstone, writing in the last half of the eighteenth century,
commented on these statutes and the duty of a parent to educate:
Our laws, though their defects in this particular cannot be
denied, have in one instance made a wise provision for breeding up
the rising generation since the poor and laborious part of the
community, when past the age of nurture, are taken out of the
hands of their parents, by the statutes for apprenticing poor
children (w); and are placed out by the public in such a manner, as
may render their abilities, in their several stations, of the greatest
advantage to the commonwealth.Y
Blackstone did not mention the crown as a parent to all because there
was evidently no need to justify legislation which controlled the labor of
the lower classes, even at the expense of their family solidarity.
Blackstone continued: "The rich indeed are left at their own option,
whether they will breed up their children to be ornaments or disgraces
to their family," 35 evidently unaware of the developing doctrine of
parenspatriae.3
ENGLISH POOR LAW

IN AMERICA

The transplantation of English poor law to the colonies has been
traced in a thorough article3 and colonial poor law legislation and

practice has been discussed in some detail. 3 Involuntary apprenticeship
of the children of undeserving parents was an integral part of the poor
law in colonial North America. 39 Jernigan concluded from an
examination of the colonial sources that these provisions were in
frequent and customary use. 40 Some of the statutes cast a wide
33. 43 ELIZ. c. 2 (1601).
34. BLACKSTONE, I CONIMENTARON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 451, 513-14 (18th ed.

1821).
35. Id. at 514.

36. Mr. Wellesley inadvertently paraphrased Blackstone in a letter which later
found its way into evidence, "there are certain things which ought to be let alone, a man
and his children ought to be allowed to go to the devil their own way, if he pleases." See
Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078, 1080, 1083 (1828).
37. Risenfield, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CAL. L.
REV. 175 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Risenfield].
38. JERIGAN. supra note 8; see also the documents from the colonial period
collected, I G. ABBOTT. THE CHILD AND THE STATE 195-213 (1938) [hereinafter cited as
G.

ABBOTT].

39. See Risenfield, supra note 37 at 214, n.232; 218; and 223, n.296.
JERIGAN, supra note 8, at 166, 182, 187.

40.
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moralistic and theocratic net. We can see the emphasis begin to shift
from "poor" to "poor plus" and the beginnings of the idea that
children should be protected from both poverty and from other
putatively dangerous environmental hazards. In eighteenth century
Virginia the local officials could bind out as apprentices the children of
parents who were poor, not providing "good breeding," neglecting
their formal education, not teaching a trade, or were idle, dissolute,
unchristian or "uncapable".11 Apprenticeship, because the child's
labor paid for his care and education, kept relief costs down in an age
of government parsimony, and theoretically trained skilled workers,
and thereby reduced idleness and unemployment."2 Even so, the quality
of the care seems questionable, and undoubtedly it was often a business
proposition for the master, and the child frequently was little more than
a slave for a term.4 3 Thus, independently of any Latin rubric, the
American colonies, and later states, developed a system of separating
children from their undeserving parents. The doctrine once established
proved worthy of emulation; and the states and territories in the West
copied their legislation from the experiences of the earlier states.4
41. Id. at 104, 151,149, 161.
42. Id. at 146-47.
43. Chapters III, IV, V, VI of Oliver Twist by C. Dickens, discuss some of the
abuses of apprenticeship in nineteenth century England.
"A 'pprentice, sir!" said Mr. Bumble. "The kind and blessed
gentlemen which is so many parents to you, Oliver, when you have none of
your own, are agoing to 'pprentie you, and to set you up in life, and make
a man of you, although the expense to the parish is three pound ten !-three
pound ten, Oliver!-seventy shillins-one hundred and forty
sixpenses!-and all for a naughty orphan which nobody can't live."
Id. Ch. 3 at 42-43 (Signet ed.). The protection seems pretty meagre. In Pennsylvania as
late as 1894, an overseer of the poor was prosecuted for indenturing a seven year old
pauper child for fouteen years to a cruel farmer. The overseer was warned before and
after the indenture and visited the farmer but reported that the boy was not maltreated.
The boy died of starvation and overwork after a few months. Commonwealth v. Coyle,
160 Pa. 36, 28 A. 576, 28 A. 634 (1894). Although the problem must not have been a new
one, the case is said to have been one of first impression (24 L.R.A. 522). Note the close
relationship between apprenticeship and slavery. See Clark's Case, I Blackford (Ind.)
122, 12 Am. Dec. 213 (1821); see also Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Toney v.
State, 141 Ala. 120, 37 So. 332 (1904). 1 consider chattel slavery to be a related but
distinct problem and do not discuss it. The practice of breaking up families by sale was
one of the most egregious components of the institution but the state was neither a buyer
nor a seller and not an integral party to the transaction. See J. LESTER, To BE A SLAVE,
THE AUCTION BLOCK 48-49 (1968). A society which treated slaves as breeding stock
would not likely be brimming with commiseration for paupers.
44. See, e.g., J. GILLIAN, POOR RELIEF LEGISLATION IN IOWA (1914); KELSO,
HISTORY OF PUBLIC POOR RELIEF IN MASSACHUSETTS
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A major social welfare issue of the early nineteenth century was
whether to extend indoor or outdoor aid to paupers. Outdoor relief was
cash paid to support the recipients in their homes; and because it was
thought to "pauperize" the poor by creating habits of idleness and

dependency, outdoor relief was thought to be inferior to indoor or
institutional relief. A study of New York relief in 1824 by Secretary of
State Yates concluded:
The education and morals of the children of paupers (except
in almshouses), are almost wholly neglected. They grow up in filth,
idleness, ignorance and disease, and many become early
candidates for the prison or grave.

and recommended,
The establishment of one or more houses of employment,
(poorhouses or workhouses) upon proper regulations in each of the
counties of the state. . . ; the pauper there to be maintained and
employed at the expense of the respective counties, in some
healthful labor, chiefly agricultural; their children to be carefully
instructed, and at suitable ages to be put out to some useful
45
business or trade.

The almshouse, workhouse or poor house became the center of poor
relief; and the doors of this venerable institution became the channel
4
through which all the poor passed.
Even though the children of the poor were apprenticed as soon as
they reached suitable age, reformers began to feel that the poorhouse
was not, under any circumstances, a proper place for children. For one

thing, they were pauperized:
Experience has shown that children brought up and
indentured from almshouses often feel toward it a filial regard,
and having been accustomed to see grown persons supported there
E. EICKHOFF, Tim MICHIGAN POOR LAW (1936); tenBroek discusses the legislation in
New York; tenBroek Family Law, supra note 32, I at 295-96, and California, supra note
32, 11 at 961-66. Apprenticeship was not used much in California, tenBroek, Family
Law, supra note 32, [1 at 965; see generally Riesenfield, Lawmaking and Legislation
Precedent in American Legal History, 33 MINN. L. REv. 103 (1949).
45. The quotations are from H. THURSTON, THE DEPENDENT CHILD 24 (1930)
[hereinafter cited as THURSTON]; the Yates report is summarized. Id. at 19-24.
46. LAWS oF NEW YORK, 47th Session, Ch. CCXXXI at 383 (1924) (unless ill,
§ I 11); GILLIAN, supra note 7, at 89; see also C. DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST, Ch. I, II, III
for life in an English workhouse.
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for no other reason than that they were addicted to idleness and
intemperance, again resort to it themselves rather than encounter
the common difficulties of life.47

In addition, the children were vulnerable to epidemic disease"8 and
moral pollution from indiscriminate contact with adult paupers,
vagrants, and criminals.4" Thus, the potential abuses of the
apprenticeship system were preferable to life in the poorhouse;60
therefore, the government continued to break up families and to
separate children from their parents.
The poorhouse or almshouse was always present and the
development of alternatives was ragged, irrational and incomplete yet
constant. The poor law itself changed very little.5 1Instead subordinate
alternatives were created which eventually superseded the original. The
original arrangement in turn became subordinate but continued to exist
47. H. FOLKS, DESTITUTES, NEGLECTED AND

DELINQUENT CHILDREN

22 (1900)

[hereinafter cited as FOLKS].
48. Id. at 21.
49. Id. The poorhouse contained:
[R]ogues, vagabonds, and idlers . . . common pipers, fiddlers,
runaways, stubborn servants or children, common drunkards, common
night walkers, piferers, wanton and lascivious persons either in speech or
behavior, common railers, or brawlers such as neglect their callings,
misspend what they earn, and do not provide for themselves or the support
of their families.
JERIGAN, supra note 8, at 202-03, or in Gillian's words was:
[T]he refuge of the hopeless, the deathhouse of the pauper sick, the
winter home of the diseased vagrant, the last refuge of the broken down
prostitute, the asylum for the insane, the lying-in hospital both for the
feebleminded members and also for the poor unfortunate girl, the victim
partly of ignorance and partly of lust, and perhaps saddest of all, the home
of some independent, high-spirited persons whom misfortune or filial
irreverence in his declining days left with only such a place in which to close
his eyes in the last long sleep.
GILLIAN, supra note 7 at 90; F. Allen notes:
Lawyers and social workers, for example, may well be reminded that
the distinction between penal treatment and the administration of welfare
services is one that has sometimes been far from clear, even in theory. This
is especially likely to be true in a culture that tends to conceive of poverty,
unemployment, and even physical handicaps as evidence of a lack of moral
fiber in those who suffer such misfortunes.
F. ALLEN, TRE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (1964).
50. GILLIAN, supra note 7 at 220.
5 1. tenBroek, Family Law, supra note 32, 1at 297, 316; I1at 94 1; compare 18 ELIZ.
c. 3 (1576) with IOWA CODE § 252.26 (1966); compre43 ELIZ. c. 2 § (1601) with IOWA
CODE § 252.6 (1966).
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in the shadow of the innovation. Thus, today along with aid to families
with dependent children and the juvenile court we still find county
farms and general relief. Much of the confusion in the study of these
trends comes from a failure to observe the central position of the poor
laws, pauper control and the poorhouse. Fox, 52 for example, views
development of residential institutions for children in the nineteenth
century through the juvenile court with an emphasis on what came to
be the juvenile court's delinquency jurisdiction. His analysis is
unhistorical because it emphasizes what the juvenile court became, not
the way that it was conceived at the time.0 This confusion is easy to
understand for the nineteenth century viewed poverty almost as a
crime " and many of the terms were used synonymously. Thus, vagrant,
wayward, delinquent, depraved, dependent, vicious, neglected and
perhaps other adjectives were used to describe basically the same
children. Fox compounds his misunderstanding by lumping together all
children who were subject to state control as "deviants"'' and failing to
distinguish between those who were threatened by their environment
and those who were objective threats to the environment. He then
extrapolates from the idea of deviance and assumes that the extirpation
of predelinquency and the prediction of future delinquency and crime
were the sole goals of the reform movements." Fox assumes that all
state intervention in family life was designed to prevent crime and
thereby ignores the central nature of the poor laws, the nascent social
welfare, the rleationships of these efforts to the law of pauper control,
and the idea that poverty, aside from possible future criminal activity,
was seen as a threat to society. These defects, coupled with a heavy
reliance on institutional sources, press Fox's analysis into a focus on
developments in New York and Illinois and a concomitant de-emphasis
of the halting and complex growth of alternatives to Elizabethan
pauper relief and the growth of moralistic social welfare. 51
52. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Fox].
53. D. FISCHER, HIsToRIAN'S FALLACIES 135-40, 160-63 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
FISCHER].

54. Fox, supra note 52, at 1191; see the quotations supra note 49.
55. Fox, supra note 52, at 1187; FiscHER, supra note 53, at 265-67.
56. See Fox, supra note 52 at 1193.
57. FIscHER, supra note 53, at 142-44. The textual statements are, in a way, unfair
to Fox. I am in substantial agreement with many of the revisionist ideas in the article
(1193-1204, 1224, 1230) and the use of institutional sources provides valuable
background material for many of the important developments.
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The New York House of Refuge,-" established in 1824, combined
with the poor laws the movement toward humanitarian treatment of
juvenile criminal offenders. The legislation59 allowed the Society for the
Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents to incorporate, to build and
manage an institution, and to dispose of the children under its custody.
The children were to come from two sources: children convicted of
crimes and children "taken up or committed as vagrants.""0 Thus, the
house was to be an alternative available to the "commissioners of the
almshouse or bridewell"' 1 for pauper children. As was customary the
rights of the pauper parents to the custody of their children were
ignored. Pickett says "[i]f a youngster or an adult was regarded by his
betters as depraved or unable to care for himself, he seemingly deserved
no rights. .

.

.One group of people, possessing a more enlightened

sense of parenthood, stood ready to step in and wrest the child away
from the original parents.""2 Once in the house the children were
presumably to be educated and socialized. The managers were allowed
to bind the children out as apprentices, which was the common poor
law policy, but in what seems to be an improvement over the poor laws,
only with the children's consent.63 The legislation did not stray too far
from the poor law; and the indenture of apprenticeship was to contain
the same "protections" as those made for pauper children by the
overseers of the poor in the counties which lacked a House of Refuge.0 4
Once the House was in operation it became clear that most of the
subjects of its favor were vagrants, absconders from the almshouse, or
petty thieves, for in the first year only one admittee had been convicted
58. R. PicKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGIN OF JUVENILE REFORM IN NEW YORK
1815-1857 (1969) [hereinafter cited as R. PIcKETT] is a valuable source for this
period. The author de-emphasized secondary and legal material and based his research on
institutional sources. See Book Review, 75 AM. His. REv. 925 (1970); see also FOLKS,
supra note 47, at 97; Fox, supra note 52, at 1188-1207.
59. LAWS OF NEW YORK, 47th Session, Ch. CXXVI at 110 (1824).
60. Id. § IV.
61. Id.
62. R. PicKErr, supra note 58, at 58-59.
63. LAWS OF NEW YORK, 47th Session, Ch. CXXVI at 110 (1824). The statute says
that the managers of the house;
[S]hall have power in their discretion, to bind out the said children,
with their consent, as apprentices or servants, during their minority, to
such persons, and at such places, to learn such proper trades and
employments, as in their judgment will be most for the reformation and
amendment, and the future benefit and advantage of such children.
64. Id. § V.
STATE
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of a serious offense.6 5 Thus, it is a permissible inference that the House
of Refuge served essentially a poor law function despite the intention of

its founders and managers. 6 What is called juvenile reform seems to me
to be a modification of the practice of committing paupers to
almshouses or workhouses because both operated on the lower classes;

both sent the presumed beneficiaries to a residential institution; and
both apprenticed the children. The House of Refuge reformers were

humanitarians and the legislation widened the scope of permissible
state intercession.
We can see in the House of Refuge, the seeds of what came to be

called the juvenile court. Both were founded by "reformers" who were
middle class, conservative and culturally ethnocentric. 7 The legislation

is similar to the Elizabethan poor laws because it allows the state to
interpose on "behalf" of children in cases of "poverty" and "poverty
plus".6" The dispositional alternative of apprenticeship for the children
is the thread which ties the Elizabethan poor laws 9 to the House of
Refuge 7 and to the Illinois juvenile court.7 The New York reform was
65. Fox, supra note 52, at 1192, cites the institutional sources:
The first annual report of the Managers of the House, submitted to
the Society and the public in 1825, reveals that, of the 73 children received
during the first year of operation, only one had been convicted of a serious
offense (grand larceny), nine had been sent for petty larceny, and the
remaining 63 (88 per cent) were in the House for vagrancy, stealing, and
absconding from the Almshouse. In the following year, the percentage
committed for "vagrancy, stealing, and absconding" was approximately
the same.
However, Fox's emphasis on delinquency and crime prediction prevents him from
apprehending the import of the data. He assumes that the statutes described potential
future criminals while the descriptions were taken over from the poor laws, embroidered
with opprobrious adjectives and used to describe poverty, an existing fact. Rather than
crime prediction the legislature, it seems to me, was describing a way of life or status.
Thus, the dependency and neglect definitions in the Illinois Juvenile Court Act [LAWS OF
ILLINOIS, 41 G.A. Juvenile Courts at 131-137 (1899)] and the alternatives for disposition
such as apprenticeship (Id. § 8) were in many respects descendents of the feudal Statute
of Artificers [5 ELiz. I ch. 4 (1562)] and later poor law legislation.
66. R. PicimTr, supra note 58, at 55, 57, 58, 89, 102.
67. Compare R. PIcKETr, supra note 58, with A. PLATT, Tii CHILD SAVERS (1969);
see also J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE (1963).
68. Compare LAWS OF NEW YORK, 47th Sess. Ch. CXXVI, § IV (1824) with
LAWS OF ILLINOIS, 41 G.A. Juvenile Courts, § 1, at 131 (1899); also compare LAWS OF
NEW YORK, 47th Sess. Ch. CCXXXI with ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES, Ch. 107 (1912)
(poor laws).
69. 43 ELIz. c. 2 (1601).
70. LAWS OF NEW YORK, 47 Sess., Ch. CXXVI, § IV (1824).
71. LAWS OF ILLINOIS, 41 G.A. Juvenile Courts, § 8 at 131-37 (1899).
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evidently completed without use of the phrase parens patriae. There
was, however, a Latin phrase, in loco parentis," which would seem to
express the power of the state to control the child once it had obtained
custody rather than a state interest which is over and above the interest
of a parent. It is the latter which has come to be called parenspatriae.
Parenspatriaewas first used by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
to justify statutory commitments to a residential institution for
juveniles in Ex parte Crouse.13 The reported opinion is apparently an
appeal from a denial of habeas corpus. Mary Ann Crouse, upon her
mother's petition, had been committed by a justice of the peace to the
House of Refuge as unmanageable. Her father sought her release and

argued that commitment without a trial by jury was unconstitutional.
The court, in a one page per curiam opinion, without citing any
authority, held that the purpose of the House of Refuge was
improvement, reformation, wholseome restraint, and protection from
depraved parents or environment; and that if the statutory procedure
was followed, a jury trial was not necessary.
The court's discussion of the right to a jury trial before the child
was detained is only three sentences long.74 The balance of the short
opinion is dicta and devoted to the rights of parents and the state in
72. R. PIcKETT, supra note 58, at 47.
73. 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Penn. 1839).
74. Id.
As to abridgment of indefeasible rights by confinement of the person,
it is no more than what is borne, to a greater or less extent, in every school;

and we know of no natural right to exemption from restraints which
conduce to an infant's welfare. Nor is there a doubt of the propriety of

their application in the particular instance. The infant has been snatched
from a course which must have ended in confirmed depravity; and, not
only is the restraint of her person lawful, but it would be an act of extreme
cruelty to release her from it.

The court, when it says, "The infant has been snatched from a course which must have
ended in confirmed depravity," is allowing prediction and it assumes that, given the
talisman, the prediction was accurate. The presumed accuracy of the prediction justifies

the extreme measure. The prediction is "confirmed depravity" which may be either
pauperism or crime. The child, after all, was only refractory. Recent emperical
scholarship concludes that such predictions are inaccurate generally because they
overpredict. See STANFIELD AND MAHLER, CLINICAL AND ACTUARIAL PREDICTIONS OF
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY 245 (1968); for the difficulties
inherent in accurate emperical research, see D. WEST, PRESENT CONDUCT AND FUTURE
DELINQUENCY (1969); Ketcham, Book Review, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1464, 1467 (1970).
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children. The court took the position that the state has almost plenary
authority to intervene in parent-child relations:
To this end (reformation, by training its inmates to industry;
by imbuing their minds with principles of morality and religion;
by furnishing them with means to earn a living; and above all, by
separating them from the corrupting influence of improper
associates) may not the natural parents, when unequal to the task
of education, or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parens

patriae, or common guardian of the community? It is to be
remembered that the public has a paramount interest in the virtue
and knowledge of its members, and that of strict right, the
business of education belongs to it. That parents are ordinarily
intrusted with it is because it can seldom be put into better hands;
but where they are incompetent or corrupt, what is there to prevent
the public from withdrawing their faculties, held, as they
obviously are, at its sufferance? The right of parental control is a
natural, but not an unalienable one. It is not excepted by the
declaration of rights out of the subjects of ordinary legislation;
and it conseqnently remains subject to the ordinary legislative
power which, if wantonly or inconveniently used, would soon be
constitutionally restricted, but the competency of which, as the
government is constituted, cannot be doubted! 4"
There we have it. The Latin phrase parens patriaehad acquired
meaning over a long period of time and was sensibly applied! 5 But it
was an equitable concept applied by the chancellors between private
parties and usually where property or guardianship was in issue.76 The
Crouse case took this phrase and transplanted it into a branch of the
poor law where it was used to justify the state statutory schemes to part
7
poor or incompetent parents from their children.
74.1. Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, (Penn. 1839).
75. Cogan, supra note 14.
76. See text at notes 14-16. See also N. MORRIS AND HAWKINS, THE HONEST
POLITICAN's GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 157 (1970):
The juvenile court emerged from what was a legal misinterpretation of
the parenspatriaeconcept. This concept was developed for quite different
purposes -property and wardship-and had nothing to do with what
juvenile courts do now. Though we keep on prating parens patriae, we
might as well burn incense. Historical idiosyncrasies gave us a doubtful
assumption of power over children. With the quasi-legal concept of parens
patriae to brace it, this assumption of power blended well with the earlier

huminitarian traditions inthe churches and other charitable organizations
regarding child care and childsaving. The juvenile court is thus the product
of paternal error and maternal generosity, which is not unusual genesis of
illegitimacy.
77. The doctrine later came to stand for the proposition that because of the peculiar

Published by Scholar Commons, 1971

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 2
[Vol. 23

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

In early American law there were two theories which allowed the
state to displace a parents' custody of his children. Both may be
observed in Joseph Story's work.7 8 The first was the chancery power of
parens patriae. Story's discussion of this branch of equitable
jurisdiction in his treatise on equity is primarily a redaction of the
English law." For example, on the question of parental custody, Story
lays out the reasoning of the Shelley and Wellesley cases:
For although, in general, parents are intrusted with the
custody of the persons, and the education, of their children; yet
this is done upon the natural presumption, that the children will be
properly taken care of, and will be brought up with a due
education in literature, and morals, and religion; and that they will
be treated with kindness and affection. But, whenever this
presumption is removed; whenever (for example) it is found, that a
father is guilty of gross ill treatment or cruelty towards his infant
children; or that he is in constant habits of drunkenness and
blasphemy, or low and gross debauchery; or that he professes
atheistical or irreligious principles; or that his domestic
associations are such, as tend to the corruption and contamination
of his children; in every such case, the Court of Chancery will
interfere, and deprive him of the custody of his children, and
appoint a suitable person to act as guardian, and to take care of
them, and to superintend their education.0

On the other hand there was the power of the legislature to alter by
state interest a juvenile could be deprived of his liberty without observing the procedural
requirements which are necessary before an adult is confiped. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 16
(1967). The child's right to be at liberty and not confined to an institution is an issue but
so also is the parent's right to the custody of their children. The two can easily be
confused. The court in Gault talks, in the essay part of the opinion, of the child's interest
in his liberty (387 U.S. at 13, 17, 27-28), but holds that the parent must receive notice of
the hearing because of his interest in the custody of the child, (387 U.S. at 33-34) and that
the parent must be notified of the right to counsel (387 U.S. at 41-42). Perhaps the Court
assumed that the parent can assist the child in regaining his liberty. Or perhaps the parent
has an interest in the custody of his children, which is independent of the child's interest in
liberty. Fox ignores the parental right to custody completely (cf. Fox, supra note 52, at
1215, n. 142); this, I believe, is due to his focus on delinquency which involves the child's
liberty. Pickett realizes the existence of the issue but does not develop it. R. PICKETr,
supra note 58, at 58-59.
78. See generally J. STORY, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 102-08 (1936);
Kent adds nothing to the inquiry, see II KENT, KENTs COMMENTARIES, Lecture XXX(l),

217-21 (1836) Cf. Insurance Company v. Bangs, 103 U.S. 435,438-39 (1880).
79. 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, Ch. XXXV, §§ 1327-61 (4th ed. 1846).
Story included some American decisions, e.g., Id. at 777, n. 3, but they followed the
English cases.
80. Id. at 775-76. See cases supra, notes 17-18. See my objections, supra notes 19-
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statute the relationships between the child, the parents and the state.
Story had occasion to deal with that power in a case on circuit. 81
Robert Treadwell a minor had joined the navy but later found it not to
his liking and deserted. He was apprehended, pleaded guilty, and was
sentenced to two years service without pay. His father sued out a
habeas corpus against Commodore Bainbridge alleging that Robert
had enlisted without his consent and asking custody. 82 Story ordered
the minor remanded to his commanding officer s' but, in the process,
wrote extensively on the issue of the government's role in intra-family
matters. Story's reasoning was as follows. The first rule was the
parents' right to the custody and control of his infant children, but this
right was qualified at three points: first by the doctrine that a parent's
contract for a child should be of some benefit to the child, second by
the criminal law and, third by the general police power. On the latter
point Story says:
Be the right of parents, in relation to the custody and services
of their children, whatever they may, they are rights depending
upon the mere municipal rules of the state, and may be enlarged,
restrained, and limited as the wisdom or policy of the times may
dictate, unless the legislative power be controlled by some
constitutional prohibition. .

.

. Can there be a doubt, that the

state legislature can, by a new statute, declare a minor to be of full
age, and capable of acting for himself at fourteen, instead at
twenty-one years of age? Can it not emancipate the child
altogether from the control of its parents? It has already, in the
case of paupers, taken the custody from the parents, and enabled
the overseers of the poor to bind out the children as apprentices, or
servants, during their minority, without consulting the wishes of
the parents.'
Story then noted that Congress may and had abrogated the
necessity for parental consent to a minor's enlistment. Congress was
constitutionally delegated the power to make war as well as the power
"to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers." ' The intent of Congress, Story
felt, must prevail. Parental consent was not mentioned in the
legislation, which said "boys", but neither was it required. Thus, prior
81. United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946 (No. 14,497) (D. Mass. 1816).

82. Id. at 947.
83. Id. at 952.
84. Id. at 949-50.

85. Id. at 949, quotingfrom U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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legislation,8" federal supremacy 7 and the necessities of war and naval
service, as opposed to land duty,8" combined to mean that the parents'
consent to a naval enlistment was unnecessary.
Although Story cited some of the English chancery cases for the
proposition that a parent has a right to the custody of his children, 88 it
is clear that there are some differences between the doctrines. The
statutory power is limited by the Constitution" while it seems that the
chancery power of parenspatriaeis only limited by the predilections of
the chancellor."1 The parties to a chancery suit, however, were private
litigants while in the statutory cases the state was the moving party and
the private litigant was forced to act or respond in the face of the
awesome power of the government.
However, Story's reasoning may be too fine spun and attenuated.
In Ex Parte Crouse9 ' when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used the
chancery phrase parens patriae in a statutory case, it seems to have
defined the Latin phrase as coexistent with the general legislative power
86. "Whenever the rights of parents were intended to be saved, a special proviso was

uniformly introduced for that purpose." 24 F. Cas. at 952.
87. Id.
88. Story's patriotism is very evident here.

It is certain, that the services of minors may be extremely useful and
important to the country, both in the army and navy. How many of our

most brilliant victories have been won, on land and sea, by persons, who
had scarcely passed the age of minority? In the navy, in particular, the
employment of minors is almost indispensable. Nautical skill cannot be

acquired, but by constant discipline and practice for years in the sea
service; and unless this be obtained in the ardor and flexibility of youth, it
is rarely, at a later period, the distinguishing characteristic of a seaman. It
is notorious that the officers of the navy generally enter the service as
midshipment as early as the age of puberty; and that they can never receive
promotion to a higher rank, until they have learned, by a long continuance
in this station, the duties and the labors of naval welfare. And to this early
discipline and experience, as much as to their gallantry and enterprise, we
may proudly attribute their superiority in the contests on the ocean during

the late war.
Id. at 949-50.
89. Id. at 949.
90. Id.
91. See supra note 80. Pomeroy observed: "There is bne fundamental rule viz., that

the exercise of the jurisdiction depends upon the sound and enlightened discretion of the
court, and has for its sole object the highest well-being of the infant." Ill POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1308 at n. 1 (1883).
91.1. 4 Wart. 9 (Penn. 1839).
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to regulate.9" It seems sensible to assume that the Pennsylvania court
was stating the general policy power of the legislature in Latin. This
may be what Pomeroy meant in 1883 when he wrote: "In this country,
according to our system of government, the power of parens patriae
belongs exclusively to the legislature of each state, and is not possessed
by the courts." 9
We have seen how, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the
chancery phrase parens patriaecame to be used to justify the state in
sundering children from parents. I have argued that the state separation
of children from their parents was a lineal descedent of poor law
mechanisms for parting pauper children and their parents and placing
the children out as apprentices and that parens patriae was no more
than a phrase added, after the fact, as a reason for the regulation. There
were some additions. The movement to almost exclusive indoor relief,
and the humanitarian desire to save children from the bad influences of
jails and poorhouses joined in the House of Refuge and in similar urban
residential juvenile institutions. Categories of families potentially
subject to the intercession widened from "poor" to "poor plus" and
the statutes came to include "idle or dessolute" children and those
whose parents were drunken or neglectful.94 Present or potential
95
breaches of the criminal law gave the state protective jurisdiction.
PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION

From this point onward I concentrate my study on what I refer to
as protective jurisdiction or the power to intercalate where the child is
considered to be in danger from his environment as opposed to
delinquency jurisdiction over the child who is dangerous to others.
Merely locating the decisions where certain words are used is a
92. "The parens patriae or common guardian of the community," Id. at 11; see
also People ex rel. Splain v. New York Juvenile Asylum, 2 T&C 475,478-79 (N.Y.S. Ct.
1874); tenBroek, Family Law, Supra note 32, III at 680-81.
93. Ill POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1304 at n. 2 (1883). Pomeroy's
treatment of child custody is, in general, more skeptical and less inclined to intervention
than was Story's two generations earlier; (see, e.g., §§ 1303, 1304, 1310) and this, I
believe, is because Pomeroy was aware of the monarchial origins and feudal implications
of the chancery power of parens patriae.He did not take up the statutory regulation of
family affairs, (§ 1303 at n. 1) but discussed only the general powers of the court of
equity.
94. MASSACHusETrs LAWS OF 1826, Ch. 182 § 3.
95. See Fox, supra note 52.
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historical trap; and the proper inquiry must be to filter the available
evidence and to discern what the ideas came to mean in the statutory
regulation of the lives of poor parents and their children. If, as I

assume, parenspatriaein the nineteenth century was a statement of the
general power to regulate, then how was that power exercised by the

legislature and administered by the executive and limited by the courts.
These are the matters to which I will now direct my attention.
My assumption, is that, before the Civil War, the great majority

of pauper children were relegated to the poorhouse and summarily
apprenticed. The historical slate is not completely void but the evidence
is subdued. The overseers of the poor and almshouse stewards did not
leave the same kind of records as the reformers who founded the House
of Refuge. The Houses in the large eastern cities were an alternative or
model for future change, but they were formally chartered to handle
dangerous rather than endangered children and did not have enough
space for the volume.
The House of Refuge did not catch on before the Civil War but
remained a minor alternative in the spectrum of state response to
parental poverty and mistreatment. In 1856 in New York State, with
the exception of Kings and New York counties, there were fifty-five
almshouses containing 4,936 people-837 lunatics, 273 idiots, and
1,307 children of all ages;98 and between 500 and 600 children were
apprenticed out of New York poorhouses each year. 7 The reformers
felt that anything was better than the almshouses and worked for
legislation forbidding the commitment of children to almshouses.
Following New York's example,"8 Ohio, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maryland, New
Hampshire, Indiana and New Jersey passed legislation regulating
children in poorhouses.11

The problem, of course, was what to do with the children. Public
home relief was against the prevailing ideology because it
"pauperized" the poor."' Private charity was inadequate.,"
96. THURSTON, supra note 45, at 28.
97. 2 G. ABBOtT, supra note 28 at 67.
98. LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Ch. 173 (1875).
99. FOLKS, supra note 47, at 47-5 1.
100. 2 G. ABBOTr, supra note 38, at 5-6; E. ABBOTT, FROM RELIEF TO SOCIAL
SECURITY 517-18 (1941), [hereinafter cited as E. ABBOTT].
101. G. ABBOTT, supra note 38, at 5-6; E. ABBOTT, supra note 100, at 517-18.
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Apprenticeship was too slow and there weren't enough masters. In
addition, craft skills learned during several years of close contact with
an older craftsman were becoming obsolete in the new age of division of
labor. If the practice of separating poor children from their parents was
to continue, the placement dilemma had to be resolved.
In the years between 1875 and 1900 a variety of public alternatives
to poorhouse care were developed. A pattern is discernable but there is
no consistency; therefore, examples will suffice. Even so, the catalogue
may seem dreary and redundant and the reader may wonder whether
the statutory language had any application to reality. The writer
assumes, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that it did. 02 In
Iowa, where poorhouse commitment and retention of children has not
been forbidden as of 1970, an orphanage for orphans of civil war
veterans had been established during the war to spare these blue ribbon
poor from the ravages of the poorhouse. When there were not enough
soldier's orphans to fill the institution, it was opened to destitute
children generally.103 Gillian noted that this was due less to
commiseration for the poor than to community desire to retain a state
payroll.1" However, the county of settlement was charged for the care
of children of non-veterans and most children without a veteran parent
stayed in the county poorhouse where they cost the county less to
maintain, or were later sent to reform schools where the state paid all
the bill. 1 5
Michigan forbade children in poorhouses and established an
institution at Coldwater for the poor, the neglected, and the ill-treated
who, upon commitment by probate judges, became wards of the state
to be placed out at the first opportunity. 01 Other states had county
children's homes, paid subsidies to private institutions, or boarded out
their wards in private homes.I0 7
102. 1presume, in other words, that statutes have some effect on the society at large.
103. ACTS OF THE 16TH G.A., Ch. 94 (Iowa 1876). Leyendecker calls this
"preferential assistance". LEYENDECKER, PROBLEMS AND POLICY IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
52-57 (1955).
104. GILLIAN, supra note 7 at 201; at 368, n. 258.
105. Id. at 206-14. This, I take it, is another example of the idea that poverty and
crime were almost interchangeable or so similar as to be indistinguishable in light of the
desire to save the public rise.
106. FOLKS, supra note 47, at 53-55.
107. Id. at 52-53.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1971

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 2

[Vol. 23

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

State public institutions called juvenile asylums or orphanages
were developed elsewhere to deal with the destitute and neglected.' 8 The
word orphanage was a euphemism because ninety percent of the
inhabitants were not true orphans.' 8 These institutions received
children committed by the courts or relinquished by their parents.""
Commitment because a child was "without proper guardianship"
seems to have been heavy-handed and indiscriminate."' Following
poorhouse practice the children in the institutions were often
indentured out when they reached a suitable age." '
The criteria of state intervention and the classes of potentially
subject children began to expand. Before 1800 the state normally
intervened only in cases of poverty"' but as the century rolled on,
children who, by legislative definition, were suffering, abandoned,
neglected, improperly exposed, in the custody of a notoriously immoral
mother, were candidates for public favor.' 4 Private child saving
societies were formed to investigate abuse and neglect, to observe
courtroom proceedings where children were involved, to procure
legislation, and to control the disposition of children."'
Child saving or child rescue schemes became more comprehensive
and the idea spread."0 The New York legislature in 1877 passed an
omnibus child protection statute."' In order to protect children from
bad influences they were forbidden from entering saloons and "dance
houses" and if under "restraint or conviction" from being in the same
"prison or place of confinement
108.
109.

THURSTON, supra note 45,
TmURSTON, supra note 45,

.

.

courtroom

. . .

or vehicle..

.

at 39-91, FOLKS, supra note 47, at 25.
at 39 n.1.

110. FOLKS, supra note 47, at 41-42. See also, tenBroek, California's Welfare Law,
45 CAL. L. REv. 241,297 (1957).
111. 2 G. ABBOTr, supra note 38, at I1.In California most of the commitments
were for "leading an idle and dissolute life." tenBroek, California's Welfare Law, 45
CAL. L. REV.241, 297 (1957).
112. 1 G. ABBoTT,supra note 38, at 192-93, 223-34.
113. FOLKS, supra note 47, at 96.

114. Id. at 97. In Massachusetts the state had power over children under sixteen
"whom by reason of the neglect, crime, drunkenness or other vices of parents, or from

orphanage, are suffered to be growing up without statary parental control and education,
or in circumstances exposing, lead idle and dissolute lives." MASS. ACTS AND RESOLVES
OF 1866, Ch. 283, §§ 1, 3.
115. FOLKS, supra note 47, at 99-102.
116. See Riesenfield, Lawmaking and Legislative Precedent in American Legal
History, 33 MINN. L. REv. 103 (1949).
117. LAWS OF NEW YORK, Ch. 428 (1877).
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with adults charged with or convicted of crime, except in the presence
of a proper official." Children under the age of fourteen who were
"found begging", or "wandering and not having any home or settled
place of abode, or proper guardianship, or visible means of
subsistence," or "destitute", or in the "company of reputed thieves or
prostitutes," could be arrested and if the case were proved to the
satisfaction of a judge, be commited to "an orphan asylum, charitable
or other institution" or treated similarly to the "vagrant, truant,
disorderly, pauper, or destitute." The act was coupled, as was
customary, with criminal penalties against the offending custodian."'8
Indiana created a network of crimes against children, such as: ill
treatment, overwork, unnecessarily cruel punishment or neglect,
apprenticing or permitting the child, among other things, to be an
acrobat or contortionist, engage in an "obscene, indecent or illegal
exhibition or vocation", or "prostitution or begging."' 19 The court
could appoint a guardian for the person of the wronged child or place
the child in an asylum. The asylum authorities had power to indenture
the child and if the parent resumed custody he was required to post
bond and took his child "subject, nevertheless, to the obligations of
any indentures or legal engagements already entered into on behalf of
said minor." As part of a criminal statute, and except for certain of the
forbidden occupations, neither ingenious nor creative, the act does
show the influence of the child saving societies. The members of "any
duly organized or incorporated humane society having for one of its
objects the protection of children from cruelty" were allowed to
become guardians of the child. The societies were not given the power
to indenture but were allowed to petition for commitment of the child
to an instituion which did have the power to indenture.'
In cities of population over 75,000121 (for example, Indianapolis), a
more formal system was established. The Board of Children's
Guardians, a public body, was given jurisdiction over the "neglected
and dependent" children who were "abandoned, neglected, or cruelly
treated;" beggars; "children of habitually drunken or vicious and unfit
parents" or in "vicious or immoral association; children known by
118. See also

PUBLIC ACTs OF CONNECTICUT, Ch. 20 (1885).
119. INDIANA LAWS, Ch. 101 at 353 (1889).

120. Private organizations have been significant throughout. See, e.g., tenBroek,
Family Law, supra note 32, 1 at 257, 267, 281-82.
121. Indiana Laws, Ch. 85 at 261-63 (1889).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1971

23

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

their language and life to be vicious or incorrigible; juvenile delinquents
and truants". The Board was permitted to establish a home and
consign children to the orphan's asylums, the House of Refuge or the
Reformatory for Women and Girls. The Board with permission of the
court could indenture the child as an apprentice.
Michigan began child protection in 1881 with a statute punishing
the use of children as gymnasts and contortionists, forbidding the
presence of children in saloons and dance houses, and the practice of
not allowing children access to corrupting printed materials. Moreover,
children were not to be jailed with adult criminals nor kept in
poorhouses.'2 In 1889 removal of an "ill-treated child was one who,
among other things, was a contortionist or gymnast or frequented
saloons or dance houses, was "habitually exposed or in want",
engaged "in any occupation . . likely to endanger his health, or life,
or deprave his morals," whose parent was "an habitual drunkard, or a
person of notorious and scandalous conduct or a reputed thief." The
case was to be tried by a jury, presided over by a probate judge and
upon a positive verdict the child could be placed under guardianship,
sent to the state public school, indentured or remitted to the
superintendent of the poor to be furnished care "as for other poor
persons.""'

State power to control people expanded. As the statutory
definitions became broader more people were covered. The statutory
categories were vague, pregnant with moral connotation and peculiarly
tailored to poverty. Perhaps all the terms were synonyms for poverty.
In addition to an administrative framework for seeking out and
processing cases; institutions for the disposition of children further
increased the states' potential for control.
Not only were more families potentially subject to interference,
but the effect of the intervention became potentially more permanent.
Under the law of apprenticeship and institutional commitment, the
child remained in the legal family of his biological parents.2 4 Adoption,
122. Michigan Public Acts of 1881, No. 260, at 357.
123. Michigan Public Acts of 1889, No. 187, at 219; see also the criminal
statutes passed four years later Michigan Public Acts of 1893, No. 156 at 255.
124. This legal right was often more theoretical than actual. Whalen v. Olmstead,
61 Conn. 263, 23 A. 964 (1891). In Dumain v. Gwynne, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 270, 275
(1865), the court said:
In some of our public institutions it has been deemed expedient to
keep parents in ignorance of the place where homes have been found for
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which was unknown to the common law and not available at all in any
of the states until 185 1,' imposed a complete and permanent severance

of the adopted child's legal relation to his biological parents and
assumption of those rights and duties by the adoptive parents. 126 The

legislatures added to child protection statutes the idea that a parent,
because of his status or behavior, could lose his child completely and

permanently.

27

This addition has far reaching implications for the

public law of parent and child.
CHILD SAVING LEGISLATION

Next I will examine the child saving legislation in the courts. No
attempt will be made to draw general legal conclusions. The progress of

the legislation, although of a certain pattern, was ragged and spotty.
The legislatures had created exceptions to poor law treatment for

certain designated classes of children. In many places, poor law
alternatives remained and in some the new legislation was treated as a

part of the poor law. The beneficiaries of these government services
could not have been inveterate litigators, but the reports do contain
quite a few cases.
their children, on account of the disposition often manifested to visit them
and excite uneasiness and discontent in their minds.
See also In re Diss Debar, 3 N.Y.S. 667 (S. Ct. 1889). The New York Children's Aid
Society placed 24,000 New York City children "in various parts of the country". 2 G.
ABBOTT, supra note 38, at 140; see generally Id. at 133-53; see People ex rel. Splain v.
New York Juvenile Asylum, 2 T&C 475 (N.Y.S.C. 1874), (placement in Illinois).
125. Massachusetts was first [Acts and Resolves Ch. 324 (1851)]. Other states
followed. See generally 1 G. ABBOTT, supra note 38, at 189-224.
126. Like most absolute statements, the sentence in the text can be qualified.
Dumain v. Gwynne, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 270 (1865); see, e.g., MICH. CODE ANN.
§§ 702.80, 710.6, 710.9 (1948). See also 12 VAYNE L. Rav. 893 (1966).

127. CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE OF 1872 § 224; INDIANA LAWS OF 1889, Ch. 85, § 2;
LAWS OF NEW YORK, Ch. 438 (1884). See also In re Souris, 521 N.Y.S. 738 (Sur. 1930)
which traces the history of the doctrine; tenBroek, Family Law, supra note 32, II at 900,
954, n.587. The Georgia court recoiled from this idea and wrote adoption out of the
statute. Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S.E. 243 (1906); see also In re Kol. 10 N.D.
493, 88 N.W. 273 (190 1). Fox deals with adoption as a dispositional alternative under the
protective statutes and concludes that within the preexisting rehabilitative spirit of the
statutes the provision for adoption of children who were within the jurisdiction of the
Chicago Juvenile Court "codified the shift from congregate to family penology." Fox,
supra note 52, at 112. This assumption, growing as it does out of Fox's focus on crime
and penology, ignores the breaches of parental prerogatives. Fox, by looking at the
process rather than the result, misses the real issue which is not a minor point of
institutional organization, but is the growth of the state as a super parent. See also Fox,
supra note 52, at 1215, n.142.
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A.

Apprenticeships

Apprenticeship was the oldest alternative for the children of the
poor, and an accepted mechanism to teach a trade to children of other
classes. The rules were different for the pauper or "parish apprentice"
who was bound without the consent of his parents or himself. 8
Statutes which allowed overseers of the poor or other minor officials to
bind out the children of poor relief recipients were common in the
nineteenth century, 29 and it appears to have been a fairly regular
practice to detach children from their pauper parents and to attach
them to new masters.10
The agreement in Bardwell v. Purrington3 seems to have been
standard. It was:
[A]n indenture made by and between him and the selectmen
of Shelburne on April 5, 1861, which set forth "that the said
overseers of the poor have bound and do hereby bind George W.,a
minor son of Samuel Hayden, a poor person lawfully settled in
said Shelburne and actually chargeable thereto, unto the said
Bardwell, to follow the business of farming or agriculture, and
with him to serve from the day of this indenture until the eighth
day of September in the year eighteen hundred and seventy-three,
when the said George W. the said Bardwell will arrive at the age of
twenty-one years, during which time the said George W. the said
Bardwell shall faithfully serve;" and wherein the plaintiff
covenanted to faithfully instruct the said George in the business of
farming, and during all said term to provide for his comfortable
support in sickness and health, and cause him to be taught in
reading, writing, ciphering, and "such other branches as are
ordinarily taught in common schools," and to pay him $100 upon
his coming of age. It was admitted that a duplicate of this
indenture was duly filed with the town clerk of Shelburne. 'Nor was the judicial attitude surprising. The court stated:
It has been well said that the authority given to overseers of
128. Musgrove v. Kornegay, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 56, 58 (1859) (a good review of the
private law of indenture). See also, Owen v. State, 48 Ala. 328 (1872); Day v. Everett, 7
Mass. 144 (1810); II KENT, KENTS COMrNr'rAREES, Lecture XXXII, part I11,
at 261-66
(1836). See generally I G. ABBOTT, supra note 38, at 164-203.
129. See, e.g., the Massachusetts statutes quoted in Bardwell v. Purrington, 107
Mass. 419, 422 (1871). "A minor child who is, or either of whose parents is, chargeable
to a town as having a lawful settlement therein, or supported there at the expense of the
state, may be bound as an apprentice or servant by the overseers of the poor." Id.
130. In re Kelley, 152 Mass. 432, 438, 25 N.E. 615, 616-17 (1890) (dissent).
131. 107 Mass. 419 (1871).
131.1. Id. at 420.
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the poor to interfere in the domestic relations of families, and to
take children from their parents to be bound out as servants to
strangers, is a high and arbitrary, if not dangerous, power, in favor
of which nothing should be presumed, and everything required for
32
its lawful exercise must be shown affirmatively.

Apprenticeship cases, once in court, were subject to close scrutiny,

and strict adherence to proper procedure was required. In Mississippi,
for example, the court read into the statute the requirement of notice to
the parent.'3 A few of the courts were no longer willing to accede in the
parish practices of the seventeenth century England.
Some of the reported cases are read like page from Charles
Dickens. The 1899 Connecticut case of Harrison v. Gilbert3 4 is bound
up in the law of settlement and removal and thus somewhat
recondite,'3 but the facts show the use and abuse of state power. The

case concerns two towns and a pauper family. The Hull family lived
within the poor law jurisdiction of Wallingford but were the
responsibility of Farmington. They had six children but the father,
born in an almshouse and formerly a poor law apprentice, was a
chronic public charge. The family lived on a farm which was half paid
for but they came on hard times and required public aid for medicine.
Five of the children were taken and placed in a county home and
almshouse. The family went to Massachusetts but returned. Finally
Farmington, the jurisdiction with the primary responsibility, sent
officials to Wallingford "without any written process" and the
officials "forcibly removed Mr. and Mrs. Hull to the Farmington
almshouse." The unstated reason for this impressment seems to have
been that Farmington was responsible for aid to the Hulls and that it
was less costly in the Farmington almshouse than on the family farm in
Wallingford. The lawsuit was a habeas corpus to gain freedom for Mr.
and Mrs. Hull. It is not clear who the petitioner was, but the issue was
whether the Hulls could be released. The court held that, under the
statutory provisions, the Farmington officials acted properly and that
the Hulls could be kept in the Farmington almshouse against their will.
132. Id. at 425.

133. Howry v. Calloway, 48 Miss. 587 (1873); see also Goodchild v. Foster, 51
Mich. 599, 17 N.W. 74 (1883).
134. 71 Conn. 724,43 A. 190 (1899).
135. See generally Mandelker, The Settlement Requirement in GeneralAssistance,

U.L.Q. 21 (1956); Mandelker, Exclusion and Removal Legislation, Wisc. L.
Rav. 57 (1956).
VASH.
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The court stated: "No constitutional right was violated by the
proceedings in controversy. Town paupers belong to a dependent class.
The law assigns them a certain status. This entitles them to public aid,
and subjects them, in a corresponding degree, to public control."' So
much for the families' home, their children, and their freedom to come
and go as they pleased.
The Kansas case of Ackley v. Tinker'37 is similar. Mr. and Mrs.
Ackley lived on a small farm in Kansas and until the winter and spring
of 1879 made a passable living. In 1879 both Mr. and Mrs. Ackley
were ill and their crops failed. The parents and a small son went to the
county poorfarm and when Mr. Ackley recovered his health he left wife
and son at the poorfarm and found employment, intending to reunite
his family as soon as his fortunes were repaired. In April of 1879, the
son, age eight, without the knowledge or consent of either of his
parents, and without his consent, was apprenticed to Tinker for ten
years. Procedurally, an unverified petition was presented to the probate
judge by the superintendent of the poorfarm, alleging the son to be a
county charge and that Tinker was "willing to take him as an

apprentice."

13

The lawsuit was an appeal from the lower court's denial of the
parents' petition of habeas corpus against Tinker. In an opinion
written by Justice Brewer, later of the United States Supreme Court,
the Kansas court held the apprenticeship immune. The reasoning was
as follows: If the county is expending funds for relief whether long term
or temporary, the child is a county charge and the superintendent of the
poorfarm may apprentice the child summarily without his consent or
the knowledge or consent of his parents. 39 The decision did not
preclude the resumption of parental custody; and suggested either a suit
by the parent for custody, which seems futile if habeas corpus would
not lie, or a suit in probate grounded upon changed circumstances to
set aside the apprenticeship.' Even so, when the case was decided,
Tinker had already used the boy's services and supplied his needs for
some twenty-nine months. As was said of another of Justice Brewer's
poor law cases: "even mighty minds are circumscribed by the spirit of
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

71 Conn. at 729, 43 A. at 191.
26 Kan. 485 (1881).
Id. at 486.
Id. at487, 489.
Id. at 487, 489-90.
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their time,"' 4' and the spirit of the time was firmly fixed. Apprenticeship was a standard method of relieving the poor of the burdens and

benefits of their children and if the statutory criteria existed and the
minimal procedural niceties followed, the child was bound for his

minority.
I have argued above that the statutory power to sever children
from their pauper parents began in the poor laws. I have further

contended that orphanages and perhaps the houses of refuge were
established as alternatives to the poorhouse. The principle that poor

people were unfit to raise their children and the mechanism of placing
those children out as apprentices continued. The addition of the phrase

parens patriae,stripped as it was of analysis and true concern, did not
change anything for the people and their children;4 2 it did perhaps
make the process more palatable to the enforcers.4 3 The phraseparens

patriae and the idea that children were being rescued from a downward
course combined to detract the attention of the upper classes from

inequalities in income and the need for adequate cash assistance for
those in need.
B.

Reform Schools
The development of these trends was, of course, halting and

uneven. Nor did it proceed without some setbacks. In 1870 in Chicago,
Michael O'Connell' was immured in the state reform school under a
statute which allowed the state to arrest and take custody of any youth
between six and sixteen who "is a vagrant, or is destitute of proper
parental care, or is growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness or
141. Comment on Justice Brewer's opinion in a drought relief case [State ex rel.
Griffith v. Osaweeke Twp, 14 Kan. 418 (1875)] by the Montana court in a similar case.
State ex rel. Cryderman v. Weinrich, 54 Mont. 390, 392, 170 P. 942, 945 (1918).
142. Fox, supra note 52, at 1207..
143. See George Orwell's essay Politicsand the English Language, IV G. ORWELL,
THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 127, 135-37
(1968).
144. People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Iil. 280 (1870). Fox has some valuable
background material on the Illinois experience Fox, supra note 52, at 1207-2 1. However,
his commitment to delinquency and crime prediction leads him to misunderstand the
implications of some of the data. (See, e.g., Fox, supra note 52, at 1213 n.133). Fox
accuses the Court of "'illogic, confusion, and technical incompetence in failing to deal
with relevant cases and doctrine." Fox, supra note 52, at 1219. 1 disagree. In addition to
my usual demurrer (supra notes 52-57), 1 would like to add that Fox's emphasis at this
point on the procedural and technical detracts from the substantive rights of parents and
children.
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vice."' In the parents' collateral attack by habeas corpus the Illinois
Supreme Court assumed that because the mittimus did not indicate a
crime, young O'Connell had been apprehended and was being held
"under the general grant of power, to arrest and confine for
misfortune."' 48 The issue was whether, in the absence of "gross
misconduct or almost total unfitness on the part of the parent,"'", the
child could be committed to a reform school. Justice Thornton
summarized the power of a parent to raise and educate his child and
concluded that this power and the accompanying duties were of divine
origin, "an emanation from God."' The Justice also analyzed the
legal capacities and incapacities of children and concluded that children
were protected by the constitution.' Scrutinizing the vague and
morally connotative terms of the statute, he noted that "proper
parental care" could be subject to varying interpretations: "When we
consider the watchful supervision, which is so unremitting over the
domestic affairs of others. . . there is not a child in the land who could
not be proved . . . to be in this said condition.""' Ignorance and

idleness were not grounds for imprisonment and "vice is a very
comprehensive term. Acts, wholly innocent in the estimation of many
good men, would according to the code of ethics of others, show
frightful depravity.""'
If the statutory definitions were infirm, the lack of procedural
safeguards was hopeless, 52 and arguing that the process was
ameliorative and for the child's benefit did not make the reform school
any less a prison.10 The law was held to be unconstitutional and the
officials were ordered to discharge Daniel O'Connell. 5'
The court declined to redact the rubric of parenspatriaestating:
Such a restraint upon natural liberty is tyranny and

oppression. If, without crime, without the conviction of any
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
(1967).
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

People ex rel O'Connell v. Turner, 55 II1.280, 282 (1870).
Id. at 283.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 286-87. This idea was rediscovered in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-31
55 Ill. at 283-84.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 284-87.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 286.
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offense, the children of the state are to be thus confined for the
"good of society", then society had better be reduced to its
original elements, and free government acknowledged a failure.1

The O'Connell opinion, after the nineteenth century fashion,
overstates its points but it does face the crucial issue of the role of the
state in parent-child relationships. Justice Thornton recognized the
sham and rhetoric which imbued the process, trimmed out the
imposture, and stated the case for freedom and family sovereignty. The
opinion could not last in the statist climate of the time. It was not that
the reformers loved the family less; it was that they loved their
ethnocentric view of family life and the aggrandizement of
governmental power more.
However, the O'Connell opinion did not go without praise. Chief
Justice Issac Redfield wrote a comment on the O'Connell case in the
American Law Register."'6 He was as interested as anyone in the
extirpation of ignorance, idleness, and vice but was skeptical about the
purity of the child saver's motives and the social class bias and religious
implications of the statutes. Justice Redfield observed: "[W]e believe
the reformers of all ages have been mainly well-intentioned men, who
had the highest good of the greatest number deeply at heart." He also
stated:
We have no evil will towards reformers of any class. The love
of reform comes always from the best of purposes; from a desire to
have others participate in the beauty and excellence which we have
found for ourselves. But we cannot disguise the fact, as we look
back, across the dark tract of the ages, that reformers, in all times
and in all countries, invoke the aid of force and compulsion, in
some form. They sincerely believe themselves entitled to exercise
the strong arm of the law, in order to bring about some greater
155. Id. at 286. Justice Thornton did not cite the Crouse case (supranote 73), but he
rejects its major points. The idea that there is no protection for the family tie is explicitly
rejected:
In our solicitude to form youth for the duties of civil life we should not
forget the rights which inher both in parents and children. The principle of
the absorption of the child in, and its complete subjection to the despotism
of, the State, is wholly inadmissible in the modern civilized world.
55 II1.at 284; as is the idea that the state may establish predictive talismens for protective
intervention. "Though it is sometimes said, that 'idleness is the parent of vice,' yet the
former may exist without the latter." Id.
156. 19 Am. L. REG. 372 (1871). The comment is signed I.F.R. and Judge Redfield,
an editor, is named author in Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisor of Milwaukee
County, 40 Wisc. 328, 341 (1876).
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good, or in some shorter period, than could otherwise be
accomplished. The time for the resort to the fagot or the gibbet, or
the rack or the wheel, has indeed passed away; at which all rejoice.
But in doing so, we are in danger of forgetting, that those who
invented and exercised these engines of reform were animated by
the same spirit as ourselves-the doing of good to those who were
too ignorant or too perverse willingly to accept their highest good
at our hands. And in all times the subjects of such compulsory
reforms are prone to regard the reformers in too offensive a light,
and to give them the undeserved name of priests or puritans, or
some other offensive epithet. 5 7
The reformers, he noted, did not intend for the legislation to be
applied to people of the middle and upper classes but in "natural
operation", if not design, the statutes "have an ominous squint
towards the children of Roman Catholic parents, and of the multitudes
of poor emigrants yearly coming to our shores," and the child could be
forced into a Protestant institution and "trained in what he regards a
heretical and deadly faith."'5
Even pretermitting the potentially invidious and discriminatory
applications of legislation of this type, Justice Redfield was doubtful of
the propriety of compulsory uplift. Especially significant was the tender
and shifting area between crime and welfare:
There is a wide field of debatable ground between the
dominion of punishment for crime and that of mere improved
culture, in which it will be a long time before any very exact
definitions of jurisdiction or of the distribution of service between
the voluntary and compulsory fields can be satisfactorily fixed. I
Justice Redfield was not, in modern terms, a liberal; it would
probably be safer to call him a reactionary. His position led to
opposition to compulsory education and child labor laws. He might be
what is sometimes called a nineteenth century liberal because he wished
to reduce or eliminate government power to meddle in the private lives
of the citizens. In that respect his views sit comfortably with many
people 100 years after the time he wrote.
157. 19 AM. L. REG. at 374.

158. Id. See notes 252-64 infra.
159. 19 Am.L. REG. at 357. See on these points F.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE

ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF

(1964).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss2/2

32

Rendleman: Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenille Court

19711
C.

PARENS PATRIAE

GeneralStatutory Requirements

The protective statutes which allowed the state to sever children
from their parents spread, despite the articulate protests of Justice

Thornton and Chief Justice Redfield. The legal conclusion in the
statute was normally something like dependent and neglected but I am

inclined to assume that the statutory term was more often than not
synonymous with poor and different. It is significant that there were

lawsuits and appeals. Next to nothing appears in the judicial record in
the prior 200 years but, between 1875 and 1900, a fairly large body of
case law dealing with the protective statutes developed. Some of the

decisions were salutary, some were regressive, but there was litigation.
Perhaps, on the other hand, the broadening categories were reaching

into other social classes. In addition, there had been some progress. The
children were undoubtedly better off in reform schools, industrial
schools, houses of refuge and orphanages than they would have been in
poorhouses or as apprentices.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in one of the first developments,
articulated the idea of statutory parens patriae. In Ex Parte Crouse"'

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court merely dropped the phrase and did
not expatiate upon either the origin or extent of the power. After the

Illinois Supreme Court voided the earlier effort in O'Connell v.
Turner,16' the Illinois legislature created a new scheme to sequester

"dependent" girls 6 ' which required a detailed petition, notice to the
parents, and permitted a jury of six, and appointed counsel. The

definition, although more precise than the statute at issue in the
O'Connell case, was vague, moralistic and particularly tailored to
poverty.' 63 The facts in the first appealed case, In Re Ferrier,"4
160. 4 Whart. 9 (Penn. 1839).
161. 55 111280 (1870).
162. LAWS OF ILLINOIS, at 379 (1879).
163. Id. at 3.
Every female infant who comes within the following descriptions shall
be considered a dependent girl, viz: Every female infant who begs or
receives alms while actually selling or pretending to sell any article in
public, or who frequents any street, alley or other place for the purpose of
begging or receiving alms, or who, having no permanent place of abode,
proper parental care or guardianship, or sufficient means of subsistence, or
who for other cause is a wanderer through streets and alleys, and in other
public places, or who lives with or frequents the company of or consorts
with, reputed thieves or other vicious persons, or who is found in a house of
ill-fame, or in a poor house.
164. 103 I11.367 (1882).
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presented circumstances ripe for intercession;"' an impoverished
family, an invalid stepfather, a brutal and perhaps deranged mother
and a nine year old girl who was a truant, a runaway and a thief. On
appeal from a denial of habeas corpus, following commitment, the
court distinguished O'Connell,' upheld the statute, and affirmed the
commitment."' The court justified state intervention under the statute
by analogy to Story's view of the chancery power, through parens
patriae,to remove a child from the custody of parents who fail to meet
the proper standards, and to appoint a guardian. The power exercised
under statute by the county court was of the same nature as the
chancery power. The statute contained a procedural mechanism for
carrying out the state's interest and there was an institutional
repository for the children.' The court then discussed the child's right
to liberty and decided that the restraints were moderate rather than
excessive and, therefore, permissible."'
Except for approving the statutory requirement that the parent be
served with notice, 170 the court did not discuss the right of the parent to
the custody of his children. In the O'Connell case by way of contrast
the same court had stated:
In our solicitude to form youth for the duties of civil life, we
should not forget the rights which inhere both in parents and
children. The principle of the absorption of the child in, and its
complete subjection to the despotism of, the State, is wholly
inadmissible in the modern civilized world.
The parent has the right to the care, custody, and assistance
of his child. The duty to maintain and protect it, is a principle of a
natural law.'

Nor was there in Ferrierany discussion of the vagueness of the
statutory definition. In the O'Connell case twelve years earlier, the
same court had taken sharp issue with the subjective, moralistic and
165. Id. at 368-69.
166. Id. at 370-73. O'Connell turned on a quasi-criminal statute with less
procedural protection and resulting in penal treatment. The composition of the court was
the same. [Compare55 Ill. ii (1870) with 103 I11.iii (1882)]. Justice Thornton who wrote
O'Connell did not dissent in Ferrierbut Justice Walker who sat on O'Connell dissented
in Ferrier, 103 Ill. at 374.
167. 103 Ill. at 374.
168. Id. at 371-72.
169. Id. at 371,372-73.
170. Id. at 373.
171. 55 Ill. at 284.
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imprecise terms of that statute."1' Thus, did the Illinois Supreme Court

sound its retreat from the individualistic position it had taken twelve
years earlier?
The Ferriercase held that the state may interpose in family life
when there are constitutional statutes which allow the intervention.
Parens patriae was used as an analogy to show previous judicial
activity and thus to justify present legislative activity. Ferrier,thus, did
not hold that parens patriae provided an independent basis for the
government to interpose itself in family life. In subsequent judicial
opinions parens patriae became a slogan or a cliche to be chanted
instead of a guide to the Constitution, the statute, and the facts. In
most poverty or dependency-neglect cases the facts were ripe for
intercession of some kind. The judges had neither the power to order,
not the inclination to suggest an income maintenance system; and,
therefore, the state was allowed to proceed in established channels
without considering alternatives. The O'Connell case points to one of
the paths not taken in American history. The Illinois Supreme Court,
by striking down the legislature's idea that poor children could be
taken from their parents, gave the onus to the legislature to develop an
alternative. The legislature came back with more of the same and the
court receded. The time for adequate in-home relief had not yet arrived.
Thus the state continued, under a new guise, and with judicial approval,
the Elizabethan policy of severing poor parents from their children.
The cases which ended with a reported opinion, and I believe these
were a minute percentage, are distressingly similar. Except in a few
cases 713 the protective statutes were upheld. The parens patriae
172. Id. at 283-84.
Vice is a very comprehensive term. Acts, wholly innocent in the
estimation of many good men, would, according to the code of ethics of
others, show fearful depravity. What is the standard to be? What extent of
enlightenment, what amount of industry, what degree of virtue, will save
from the threatened imprisonment?
The Ferrier result is still the law: if there is a minimum of procedural fairness, the law
does not inquire into the substantive standard. See State v. Mattiello, 4 Conn. Cir. 55,
225 A.2d 507 (App. Div. 1966), cert denied, 154 Conn. 737, 225 A.2d 201 (1966). Prob.
juris. noted, 391 U.S. 963 (1968), cert denied (for want of a properly presented federal
question), 395 U.S. 209 (1969), (vagueness attack on juvenile delinquency statute
rejected). See generally, Comment, Statutory Vagueness in Juvenile Law: The Supreme
Court and Matiello v. Connecticut, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 143 (1969).
173. People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280; State ex rel. Cunningham v.
Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1885).
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approach appealed to the judicial and social conservatism of the age. In
a time of limited government the idea of state interference in family life

was viewed with skepticism. A parent, the state courts held, had some
sort of variously stated right to the custody of his children", and the
child had some right to liberty.' 5 However, the state had a protective
power either by analogy to the chancery power of parenspatriae or
inherent in its sovereignty' or by a simple recitation that the state was
parens patriae.'7 Statutes which carried out this state interest were
valid; and because the institutions were schools and not prisons, no
more liberty than necessary was taken when the children were placed
there.' Nor could the parent complain: "when a parent is unable or
unwilling to provide for his child, and leaves the child dependent on the
charity of the state, we are at a loss to comprehend the right of the
parent to object to the form which the state gives to its charity, with

intelligent regard for the welfare of the child.""' Even so, the courts, at
174. Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 78, 56 S.E. 243 (1906) (property right); Van
Walters v. Board of Children's Guardians, 132 Ind. 567,569,32 N.E. 568 (natural right)
(1892); Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wise. 328,
341 (natural and sacred relations) (1876). The observer will note that the vocabulary of
the law could only with difficulty be made to cover this relationship and even then the
concepts are lacking in form and substance. Analogies such as agent and trustee were
borrowed from other legal relationships; but when examined it appears that the
similarities are few and the analogy becomes a tenuous one at best. Frequently an
analogy or simile is redacted without examination and applied without thought. Thus, the
quality of understanding and conceputalization is destroyed for such usage distorts the
object it is supposed to describe. Platitudes and catch phrases, for example, "natural
right", sound pompous but are no help in deciding concrete cases. Because there are no
tools for analysis the reasoning is frequently conclusory and subjective; and the
underlying interests of all the parties are ignored. The clearest thinking on these issues I
have seen is in a Children's Bureau pamphlet. W. SHELLDON, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE
AND FAMILY COURTS (1966).
175. In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 372-73 (1882).
176. Id. at 371-73.
177. "It has been for many centuries theoretically true that the State, through its
appropriate organs, is the guardian of the children within its borders. The constitution of
a State is always presumed to be framed by organized society governed by settled
principles." Van Walters v. Board of Children's Guardians, 132 Ind. 567, 569, 32 N.E.
568 (1892).
178. Whalen v. Olmstead, 61 Conn. 263, 23 A. 964 (1891); In re Knowack, 158
N.Y. 482, 486, 53 N.E. 676 (1899); Cincinnati House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio 197,
204 (188 1); Miwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wisc.
328, 338 (1876).
179. In re Ferrier, 103 Iii. 367, 371 (1882); Cincinnati House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37
Ohio 197, 203 (1881); Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio 184, 188 (1869), cf. Milwaukee
Industrial School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wise. 328, 337 (1876).
180. Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wisc.
328. 1 '27,rIQf
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the peril of reversal, required the government to follow the statute with
5
care.' '

The courts realized that they were dealing with statutes which
descended from the poor laws. The judges, however, were not sure
whether the legislation was criminal or civil. 8 2 Statutes depriving
pauper parents of their children were old and familiar,' but these
statutes which allowed the state to intercalate on behalf of endangered
children and to place the children in an institution were new: the
schemes were protective of the child and humane in application.'U In
181. Hibbard v. Bridges, 76 Maine 324 (1884); Goodchild v. Foster, 51 Mich. 599,
17 N.W. 74 (1883); People ex rel. Van Riper v. New York Catholic Protectory, 106 N.Y.
604, 13 N.E. 435 (1887). In the Van Riper case Andrews states the case for liberty and
revealed his distrust of functionaries.
The information in these cases of summary conviction ought to be
precise and show a case clearly within the statute. It is the foundation of
the jurisdiction of the justice, and when it omits an essential ingredient or
circumstance to bring the case under the statute, and the defect is not
supplied by the evidence, the conviction is bad. It is not consistent with the
proper security of personal liberty to indulge, in cases of summary
convictions, in latitude or liberality of intendment to support the
proceedings. They are conducted contrary to the course of the common
law, without the intervention of a jury, usually before magistrates of
limited experience, and are often attended with the gravest consequences.
106 N.Y. at 609-10.
182. In Reynolds v. Howe, 51 Conn. 472, 477 (1884) the court said: "The
proceeding under the statute, for commitals by a justice of the peace to the State Reform
School, is not a criminal one, since the matter presented by the complaint is not a
criminal one; and clearly it is not a civil one." See also People ex rel. Van Riper v. New
York Catholic Protectory, 106 N.Y. 604, 13 N.E. 435 (1887) (quasi-criminal); In re
Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482, 486 (1889) (noncriminal) although the statutes were part of the
penal code.
183. Reynolds v. Howe, 51 Conn. 472, 478 (1884); "Statutes like this have been in
existence for the past two hundred years, and it is very late to call their constitutionality
in question." In In re Kelley, 152 Mass. 432, 25 N.E. 615 (1890) the dissent stated:
This right of the authorities to retain control of an apprenticed child
until he arrives at the age of twenty-one years is not affected by the
possibility that his father may soon become of ample ability to support
him. Similar provisions of law have been in existence from the earliest
times. They have often been approved by the courts, and, so far as we are
aware, have never been questioned.
Id. at 438, 25 N.E. at 617.
184. In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482, 486-87, 53 N.E. 676 (1899); Milwaukee
Industrial School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wise. 328 (1876), "Such a
statute, so framed and so guarded, is not an arbitrary assumption of meddlesome
authority, outside of the scope of the proper function of legislation; but is evidence that
public charity is here losing the offensive and oppressing character sometimes attributed
to it." 40 Wisc. at 340. The North Dakota court catches this idea and the transitional
nature of the residential institutions when it answers the involuntary servitude objection
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addition, child saving work was an outlet for the better instincts of the
weaker sex. The Wisconsin court commented on the legislation before
it:
[N]o industrial school can be without the sex which is by
nature best qualified for the nurture of the children. Such charities
are best committed to women, in whole or in part. And in such lies
the truest and noblest scope for the public activities of women, in
the time which they can spare from their primary domestic
duties.1'1

The late nineteenth century transition from pauper control to
something resembling social welfare can be traced chronologically in
the Massachusetts cases.M Massachusetts care of children began with
the overseer of the poor, changed to a pleasantly named institution, and
finally we find the chance of new parents in a presumably better home.
The terminology at least became more modern and humane and the
children were probably better treated. The first case, i"7 in 1886,
involved a "neglected" (pauper) child who had been remanded to the
custody of the overseers of the poor. Four years later in the second case,
neglected children were placed in the custody of the State Board of
Lunacy and Charity. 88 The third case,' 89 in 1893, was against the
by saying: "We cannot understand that the detention of the child at one of these schools
should be considered as imprisonment, any more than its detention in the poorhouse." In
re Kol., 10 N.D. 493, 88 N.W. 273, 277 (1901). Once the legitimacy of the poorhouse is
granted, who could argue to the contrary?
185. Milwaukee Industrial School v. Superviors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wisc.
328, 340 (1876). See J. ADAMS, THE SUBJEcTIVE NECESSITY OF SETTLEMENTS, CH. 6 OF
TWENTY YEARS AT HULL HOUSE (1915); C. LASCH, TE NEW RADICALISM INAMERICA,

3-37 (1965); A. PLArr, THE CHILD SAVERS, 75-100 (1969) [hereinafter cited as PLATT].
For an example of the "child savers" in action, see Cincinnati House of Refuge v. Ryan,
37 Ohio, 197, 197-198 (1881). On women's rights in the midwest see In re Bradwell, 55
IiI. 535, 542 (1869).
186. The Massachusetts experience, if somewhat of a model, was not repeated
elsewhere. In Iowa for example, as late as 1909, we find overseers of the poor controlling
neglect and dependency matters. See In re East, 143 Iowa 370, 122 N.W. 153 (1909). In
Iowa, in fact, the official who controls county relief is still called the overseer of the poor.
IOWA CODE § 252.26 (1966). In Pennsylvania, as late as the 1890's the overseers of the
poor were apprenticing children directly to masters. See Commonwealth v. Coyle, 160
Pa. 36, 28 A. 576, 28 A. 634 (1894), a grisly case, where a seven year old pauper child was
bound, despite a warning, to a cruel master who killed him of starvation and overwork in
a few months. The case is a criminal prosecution of the overseer who indentured the child
and who later visited the "home" and reported that the boy was not maltreated.
187. Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203 (1886).
188. In re Kelley, 152 Mass. 432, 25 N.E. 615 (1890).
189. In re Wares, 161 Mass. 70, 36 N.E. 586 (1894).
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Commissioners of Public Institutions of Boston. The last case in the
series was a contest between the pauper mother of an illegitimate child
and a couple who desired to adopt a child. 9 0Thus, the legislature had at
the very minimum euphemized the vocabulary, established new
administrators, and changed the disposition, presumably all for the
better.' But along with amelioration came the aggrandizement of state
power. In the first two cases the parent was allowed to contest the
commitment by habeas corpus; 9 2 in the third it was held that the cases
could not be reopened after full hearing because of the need for
certainty of relationships and discretion in placement.1 3 Finally, in
Purinton v. Jamrock, the discretion of the state officials was protected
against both the original parents and potential adoptive parents. 94
Thus, as the system became theoretically more humane, state power
over people's lives burgeoned.'
There were, among the appealed cases, only a few crimes."' 5 Most
of the litigated commitments seem to have been for a status and
because the reported cases are by and large appeals from procedural
190. Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 902 (edited) (1907).
191. The skeptic might say with Juliet "What's in a name; That which we call a rose
by any other name would smell as sweet." See ACTS OF THE 33 G.A. Ch. 29 § 9 (Iowa
1909) changing the name of the poorhouse of the county home.
192. Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203 (1886); In re Kelley, 152 Mass. 432, 25 N.E.
615 (1890). In the latter case three judges, including Holmes, dissented. (Id. at 436-40).
193. In re Wares, 161 Mass. 70,72, 75, 36 N.E. 586 (1894).
194. Purington v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 201-02, 80 N.E. 802 (edited) (1907).
The case is a miscarriage of justice. The mother acceded in poor relief for her child and
was held to have forfeited her right to prevent adoption or control the child's religious
education. 195 Mass. at 198-200. This was contrary to statute, MASS. ACTS AND
RESOLVES, Ch. 464 (1905). The foster parent's petition for adoption was granted but
subject to the uncontrolled discretionary custody of the State Board 195 Mass. at 197,
202. Thus, there is no real protection for anyone but the government and the result makes
a mockery of rhetorical adherence to the best interest rule and the idea that established
relationships should be maintained. Compare Dumain v. Gwynne, 92 Mass. 270 (1865).
Perhaps the state is "the ultimate parent" as Judge Mack said. Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1909).
195. See also In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482 (1899); In re Kol., 10 N.D. 493, 88
N.W. 273 (1901); Commonwealth v. St. Johns Orphan Asylum, 9 Phil. 571, (Pa. Dist.
1872); McFall v. Simmons, 12 S.D. 562, 81 N.W. 898 (1900); For the tenacious habits of
the institutions. As is often the case, the idea of administrative discretion was used to
smooth over a potential for arbitrary acts and to avoid facing the real issue. Milwaukee
Industrial School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wisc. 328, 339 (1876);
Whalen v. Olmstead, 61 Conn. 263, 23 A. 964 (1891); cf. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE 142-61 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
196. See State v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1885) (burglary); Prescott v.State, 19 Ohio 184
(1869) (arson).
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points and collateral attacks, the facts are subsumed into allegations
framed from statutory categories. Nevertheless, some tentative
conclusions about what society was doing can be garnered from
allegations like "exposed and neglected", and "in a reputed house of
assignation and prostitution", "7 and "in the company of Mary Ryan
who is a reputed prostitute."'0 Others are not so clear. For example, it
is impossible to tell for sure what was wrong from "in danger of being
brought up, and was being brought up, to lead an idle and vicious life,
against the peace, of evil example and contrary to the statute."'9 9 In
North Dakota "the mother, Ida Cole, by reason of her violent temper,
immoral habits, language, and associations, is an unfit and improper
person to have the care and custody of said minor children," was
enough of an allegation to remove the children. In Georgia an
impoverished mother with "vicious habits and guilt of habitual
drunkenness""0 ' also lost her children. Many, if not most of the
institutional commitments under the protective statutes were for simple
poverty.~21 Others were for "poverty plus" such as begging,"0 3 poverty
destitution and neglect,2 and dependency.25 And in some cases it is
impossible to tell from the decision why the child was separated from
his parents.2 6 Even so, it is evident from the decisions that small
children were being taken from their parents not because there was any
breach of the criminal law by either the parents or the children and not
because of any intentional failing of the parents, but simply because the
parents were poor and behaved as poor people always have. In addition
197. People v. Giles, 152 N.Y. 136 (1897); People ex rel. Van Riper v. New York
Catholic Protectory, 106 N.Y. 604, 610 (1887).
198. People ex rel. Van Riper v. New York Catholic Proteetory, 106 N.Y. 604, 13
N.E. 435 (1887). See also Nunn v. State, 55 Ind. App. 37, 103 N.E. 439 (1913).
199. Reynolds v. Howe, 51 Conn. 472,472-73 (1884).
200. In re Kol., 10 N.D. 493, 88 N.W. 273 (1901) (note the discrepancy in names.)
201. Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 75, 56 S.E. 243 (Habeas corpus for release
denying the evident allegation that led to commitment).
202. Whalen v. Olmstead, 61 Conn. 263, 23 A. 964 (1891); Milwaukee Industrial
School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wise. 328, 329 (1876).
203. People exrel. Van Heck v. New York Catholic Proteetory, 101 N.Y. 195, 196,
4 N.E. 177 (1886).
204. In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482,484, 53 N.E.676 (1899).
205. County of McClean v. Humphries, 104 Ill. 378, 381 (1882). Dependent seems
to have meant dependent upon the public for support.
206. See, e.g., People ex reL O'Connell v. Turner, 55 111. 280, 283 (1870)
(Misfortune); In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 368-69 (1882) is one of the few cases where the
facts upon which the separation was based are set out. See also People v. Giles, 152 N.Y.
136,46 N.E. 326 (1897).
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it is also evident that, once made, the institutional commitments were
27
potentially almost permanent, and difficult to attack.

D.

ProceduralRights
The procedural rights of the parents and children varied widely.

Apprenticeships were frequently established summarily by a lower level
administrative officer directly connected with pauper relief.2°s The

questions were whether the power to commit to an institution was
judicial;m whether notice to the parents was necessary;"'0 and what kind
of a hearing was required.2 1 Normally a commitment was affirmed if it
followed the statute.212 A related issue was the power of a parent to
213
attack an existing commitment by habeas corpus or other means.
207. Some of this was due to the tenaciousness of the institutions. See cases cited
supra note 195; the effect of an intervening adoption or apprenticeship was also
considered. Cf. In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482, 488, 53 N.E. 676 (1899); Kennedy v.
Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 78-79, 56 S.E. 243 (1906) (discussion of adoption); People ex rel.
Splain v. New York Juvenile Asylum, 2 T&C 475 (N.Y.S.C. 1874); In re Kelley, 152
Mass. 432, 36 N.E. 586 (1894), dissent at 438 (apprenticeship). The case of Ackley v.
Tinker, 26 Kan. 485 (1881), where a temporarily poor child was apprenticed out of the
poorhouse by the superintendent is also in point here although the poorhouse is not, in
name, one of the institutions we are here considering. Perhaps the courts reasoned that if
it was easy to get the children out of the institutions, then many parents would put their
children in and thereby escape the obligations of parenthood. See County of Cook v.
Industrial School for Girls, 125 Ill. 540, 572 (1888); In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482,49293, 53 N.E. 676 (1899).
208. Ackley v. Tinker, 26 Kan. 485 (1881); Farnam v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203 (1886).
209. Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wisc.
328, 334 (1876).
210. Goodchild v. Foster, 51 Mich. 599, 17 N.W. 74 (1883); Cincinnati House of
Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio 197, 202 (1881); Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203, 205-06
(1886); Reynolds v. Howe, 51 Conn. 472, 477 (1884); People ex rel. Van Heck v. New
York Catholic Protectory, 101 N.Y. 195 4 N.E. 177 (1886).
211. Wilkinson's Board of Children's Guardians, 158 Ind. 1, 8-9 (1902); Cincinnati
House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio 197, 198 (1881); People v. Giles, 152 N.Y. 136, 13940,46 N.E. 326 (1897).
212. There was of course some creative interaction between the courts and the
legislatures. After the O'Connellcase the next Illinois venture required a petition, notice
to the parents, appointed counsel and a jury trial in a court of record before an effective
commitment could be adjudicated. In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367 (1882). The New York cases
also demonstrate a dialogue between the courts and the legislature. The courts followed
the statutes carefully but could strain them. See (in reverse chronological order) People ex
rel. Van Riper v. New York Catholic Protectory, 106 N.Y. 604 (1887) (form of
complaint); Carpenter v. People ex rel. Brown 123 N.Y. 640, 25 N.E. 1044 (1890)
(notice); People v. Giles, 152 N.Y. 136,46 N.E. 326 (1897) (record of proceedings).
213. Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 80-81, 56 S.E. 243 (1906); Hibbard v. Bridges,
76 Maine 324 (1884); Roth and Boyle v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329 (1869); In re
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The safest generalizations concerning the procedural decisions are that
the result depended on the statutes and the cases are sometimes wildly
divergent.214

The parents' interest was, in some measure, recognized everywhere; and a child could not be taken from his parent's home and
institutionalized, apprenticed or adopted without some opportunity to
contest the proceeding by notice, hearing or collateral attack. These
protections may have been more theoretical than actual. Procedural
guarantees are of no use if the substantive standard is open ended, and
as may be assumed, the parents by definition lacked the intellectual and
economic resources necessary to contest the issue. The lack of an
intelligible substantive standard and the existence of only the flimsiest
procedural protections reveals an unspoken assumption that the state
had an equal if not superior interest in the children and the burden was
on the parents to show to the contrary. The procedural laxity allowed
the state to assume its conclusion. The legal rubric was that the parent
had violated his duty to the child and, therefore, had no rights to his
custody. 2 5 In any event, the absence of notice to the parent", or the
parents' absence from the hearing"t 7 guaranteed the result. What
Wares, 161 Mass. 70, 36 N.E. 586 (1894); In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482, 53 N.E. 676
(1899); Cincinnati House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio 197 (1881). Aside from parental
rights, government economy was a factor in allowing release.
The duty of the state is discharged when it affords necessary relief to
those whose support is cast upon the public, and it is plain that it should be
given for such a length of time only as necessity demands. There is nothing
more to be deprecated, than encouragement to pauperism, or the extension
of public aid to those who are able to support themselves, or the keeping of
inmates in charitable institutions, whether children or adults, beyond the
time that they can be self-supporting, or when they could be safely allowed
to shift for themselves. Nor are institutions of charity subserving their
proper function when they relieve friends or relatives of indigent persons,
able and bound to maintain them, from the burden of their support.
In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. at 492-93.
214. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S.E. 243 (1906); McFall v.
Simmons, 12 S.D. 562, 81 N.W. 898 (1900); In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482, 53 N.E. 676
(1899) as progressive. Contrast the wooden and unreconstructed decision in State ex rel.
Bethell v. Kilvington, 100 Tenn. 227,45 S.W. 433 (1898).
215. Reynolds v. Howe, 51 Conn. 422, 478 (1884); People ex rel Splain v. New
York Juvenile Asylum, 2 T&C 475 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1874); Home of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio
197 (1881).
216. In the Ryan case the three children were notified of the pendency of the
proceeding. However they were all under six. 37 Ohio at 198. See also Reynolds v. Howe,
51 Conn. at 477.
217. 37 Ohio at 198.
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interest could the parent have in his children if he did not have an

opportunity to contest their institutilization? Is The unspoken
assumption may have been that the state was all seeing, all knowing,
and of ultimate benevolence and would protect any legally cognizable

interest. That assumption is far from true; and skinflinted economy
and meanness, rather than disinterested benevolence, seem to have

activated poor law administration. 219 Rights are concrete only when
there are procedures to protect them, and when there are no procedural

protections, it is not far from wrong to say that there are no rights. M
PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE CHILD CUSTODY LAW

It is useful at this point to compare the public and the private law
of child custody. First of all there were not many cases on the issue of
child custody. Divorces were few and the fault concept was in full
force.21l There was some appellate law concerning the issue of child
custody between a parent and a relative who was not a parent.tm The
m
rules are easily stated. A parent had some sort of presumptive right,2
but an unfit natural parent might lose custody of his child,22 and in all
cases even where the parent was "fit" the "paramount consideration
is, what will promote the welfare of the child?"

218. In Ohio the parent was not precluded from collateral attack. Id.
219. See the removal cases. Harrison v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 724, 43 A. 190 (1899).
See Wood v. Boone County, 153 Iowa 92, 133 N.W. 377 (1911); Cerro Gordo County v.
Boone County, 152 Iowa 692, 133 N.W. 132 (1911); Cass County v. Audubon County,
221 Iowa 1037, 266 N.W. 293 (1936); Thiede v. Town of Scandin Valley, 217 Minn. 218,
14 N.W.2d 400 (1944); Settlement of Cegan, 212 Minn. 75, 2 N.W.2d 433 (1941). See
note 135 supra. See Aug. 1969 CIVIL LIBERTIES at 6, for a report of the continuing vitality
of the idea that the poor may be sent back where they came from.
220. "The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural
safeguards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
221. See, e.g., W. -v. W 141 Mass. 495 (1886) (Holmes J).
222. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881); Prime v. Foote, 63 N.H. 52 (1884).
Charles Doe was Chief Justice and sat on both this case and State v. Ray, 63 N.H. 604
(1885).
223. Stapleton v. Poynter, 111 Ky. 264, 62 S.W. 730 (1901); see tenBroek, Family
Law, supra note 32, 1.at 299-300, 313-16; II at 915-27 (1964).
224. Prime v. Foote, 63 N.H. 52 (1884) (the court cited the English chancery cases
for this proposition).
225. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kans. 650, 654, 656 (1881). Justice Brewer cited no cases
in his opinion, not even for the proposition that a drunken or immoral parent will lose the
custody of his child. Id. at 653. The Chapsky case is the subject of extended discussion in
SAYRE, AWARDING CUSTODY OF CHILDREN, SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW, 588,
592-601 (1950).
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Pomeroy discussed the private law of child custody in his treatise
on equity,26 and the differences between the public and private law are
immediately apparent. First, almost all the private law cases
concerned the wealthy and involved property. m
The question was; when may the parent be displaced in custody?
As Pomeroy propounded the law, the similarity to the boiler plate in a
public law case is noticeable:
The court of equity will also exercise its jurisdiction, in a
proper case and to promote the highest welfare of the infant, where
there is already a guardian, natural or legal, by controlling the
person of the infant, and by removing it personally from the
custody of its natural or legal guardian, even from the custody of
its own parents. By the common law, as well as by the law of
nature, the father is the natural guardian of his infant children. It
is not only the father's right but his imperative duty to have
custody of the persons of his infant children and to educate and
train them so as to promote their future well-being as members of
society. The equitable jurisdiction over the persons of infants is
based upon this parental duty, and is an indirect means of
enforcing it by furnishing a remedy for its violation. The
jurisdiction is a delicate one; it rests in the highest degree upon the
enlightened discretion of the court; and will only be exercised when
plainly demanded as the means of securing the infant's present and
future well-being. It is well settled, therefore, that a court of equity
may interfere on behalf of infants and remove them from the
custody and control of their father, or mother, whenever the
habits, practices, instruction, or example of the parent, exerting a
personal influence on the infants, tend to corrupt their morals and
undermine their principles; or when the parent is neglecting their
education suitable for their condition in life; or is endangering
their property; or is guilty of ill-treatment or cruelty towards
them.m
Pomeroy disclaimed an intention to denote the fact situations which
would allow the court to take a child from the parent and cited the rule
"that the exercise of the jurisdiction depends on the sound and
enlightened discretion of the court, and has for its sole object the
highest well being of the infant."m The "best interest" rule cannot be
226. POMEROY, III POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1303-1310 (1883). See
also notes 91, 93 supra.
227. Id. § 1305 at 328.
228. Id. § 1307. The chancery cases are cited in support of this statement.

229. Id. at 330 n.1.
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commended for precision and predictability, but when one gets down to
cases the difference between private and public child custody cases is
immediately apparent.
"Mere insolvency of the father" Pomeroy stated, "is not
sufficient ground for interference" with the custody of the parent.23
The Nebraska court went further:
The court has never deprived a parent of the custody of a
child merely because, on financial or other grounds, a stranger
might better provide. The statute declares and nature demands
that the right shall be in the parent, unless the parent be
affirmatively unfit. The statute does not make the judges the
guardians of all the children in the state, with power to take them
from their parents, -so long as the latter discharge their duties to
the best of their ability,-and give them to strangers, because such
strangers may be better able to provide what is already well
provided. If that were the law it would be soon changed,-by
revolution, if necessary.?'
It is impossible to reconcile these statements about the private law of
child custody with the statutes which allowed children to be taken from
their parents because of poverty,232 and the fact that during the
nineteenth century children, in wholesale lots, were separated from
their parents because of their parents' poverty.2 There had been only a
230. Id.
231. Norval v. Zinsmaster, 57 Neb. 158, 161-62, 77 N.W. 373, 374 (1898). See also
Stapleton v. Poynter, Ill Ky. 264, 62 S.W. 730 (1901).
232. See, e.g., The language of the first Illinois juvenile court statute "any child who
for any reason is destitute or homeless or abandoned; or dependent on the public for

support" could be committed for his minority to an institution which could indenture the
child as an apprentice or agree to formal adoption. LAWS OF ILLINOIS, 41 G.A. JUVENILE
COURTS, §§ 1, 7-8 at 131 (1899).
233. Figures are hard to come by, but I submit that the textual statement is
confirmed by the following sources. 2 G. ABBOTT,THE CHILD AND THE STATE 11, 133-63,
347-49, 374 (1938); H. FOLKS, DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED AND DELINQUENT CHILDREN, 72
(31,799 children in New York City controlled by private organizations) (1900); M.
166 (1960);
R. PICKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE (entire) (1969); H. THURSTON, THE DEPENDENT CHILD,
JERIGAN, THE LABORING AND DEPENDENT CLASSES IN COLONIAL AMERICA,

92-160 (1930); tenBroek, Family Law, supra note 32, 1. at 958, 972 n.695 (1964). The
institutions and officials were local, the procedures were informal and evidently few
records were kept. The first systematic attempt to gather data seems to be H. JEER, THE
CHICAGO JUVENILE COURT (1920 Children's Bureau #104). Between 1913 and 1917
about 200 children were indentured each year in Wisconsin. E. LUNDBERG, CHILDREN
INDENTURED BY THE VISCONSIN STATE PULBIC SCHOOL (1918 CB #150); 1 G. ABBOTT,
THE CHILD AND THE STATE, 232-34 (1938). In 1938 Grace Abbott stated "the practice of
taking children from their parents solely on the ground of poverty is rapidly
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few protests. In the O'Connellcase the Illinois Supreme Court had said
"such a restraint upon natural liberty is tyranny and oppression. If,
without crime, without the conviction of any offense, the children of the
State are to be thus confined for the 'good of society', then society had
better be reduced to its original elements, and free government

acknowledged a failure." But by and large the dual system of family
law was accepted without question and even with alacrity. In 1898, the
Charter of the Michigan Children's Aid Society proclaimed the
mission of the organization to "seek homeless, neglected and destitute
children and to become their friend and protector, to find homes for
them in well to do families and to place them there wisely with the least
possible delay." 2 5

Poor people were excluded from the idea that parents should be
allowed to raise their own children. I believe the result can be explained
as a deduction from the prevailing ideology. As Handler and Goodstein
point out,218 the biological determinism and Social Darwinism which
typified dominant iedology in this period, compelled a distinction
between the merely poor and paupers. The latter group was composed
of moral degenerates who, like the diseased, should be isolated for the
disappearing," because of the availability of home aid. 2 THE CHILD AND THE STATE 167
(1938). But in the 1950's, see Savery v. Eddy, 242 Iowa 822, 45 N.W.2d 872 (1951),
rehearing, 48 N.W. 2d 230 (195 1); in the 1960's large numbers of children were separated
from impoverished parents. See JACKSON, FACELESS FAMILIES AND FORLORN CHILDREN
(Study of institutional placements in the District of Columbia, in 1962) at 94, 121-231 of
Hearing on § 1817 before the Public Health Education, Welfare and Safety
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, 87th Cong. ist
Sess. (1965). The Michigan statute which allows the state to take custody of
impoverished and illegitimate children was recently construed. MICHIGAN COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 712A.2(b)(2) construed in Franzel v. Michigan State Dept. of Social
Welfare, 180 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Ct. App. 1970).
234. People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Il1. 280, 286 (1870); see also Verser v.
Ford, 31 Ark. 27, 29-30 (1881) (private custody case), where it is stated:
It is one of the cardinal principles of nature and of law that, as against
strangers, the father, however poor and humble, if able to support the child
in his own style of life, and of good moral character, cannot, without the
most shocking injustice, be deprived of the privilege by any one whatever,
however brilliant the advantage he may offer. It is not enough to consider
the interests of the child alone.
235. Quoted W. DOWNS, MICHIGAN JUVENILE COURT LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.85
(1963).
236. Handler and Goodstein, The Legislative Development of Public Assistance,
1968 WIs. L. REV. 414,416-20.
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protection of the rest;23 and no usage was too bad for the paupers. As
the Connecticut court said in 1883:
Next to intemperance, and generally accompanying it, a habit
of idleness helps to fill our almshouses with paupers and our jails
with criminals. By means of these two causes the burden is
imposed on the public of maintaining a worthless class
of
M
humanity as well as the great expense of our criminal courts.

The reformers did feel, however, that the children could be salvaged;
and if they were removed from corruption and temptation and placed in
a salutary environment, there was a good chance of rehabilitation. 29
Thus, based on the distinction between poverty and patiperism, official
thought acceded in the proposition, carried over from the Elizabethan
poor laws, that paupers had no cognizable rights appertaining to the
custody of their children, and the dual system of law endured.240 If a
normal person was merely insolvent, he was only poor and unfortunate;
there was no cause to interrupt his relationship with his children. But a
pauper was, perforce, a degenerate and could not be heard to protest
against the government forbidding him to infect the rising generation.
In addition the protective statutes were available to protect and
vindicate conventional middle class views; that is, people who were
different could be deprived of their children. Demon Rum was thought
by the dominant classes to be a major cause of the problems of the
lower classes. 241 The use of spirits by parents contributed, in the eyes of
the reformers, to neglect, delinquency, and pauperism; 212 and it should
not be too much of a surprise to find that children who frequented
243
saloons could be institutionalized.
237. Cf. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142 (1837) (pauperism is "moral
pestilence" subject to quarantine).
238. Reynolds v. Howe, 51 Conn. 472,477 (1883).
239. Supra, note 236 at 422-27.
240. The Wisconsin court said "it is difficult to comprehend the right of a parent to
complain, that the discharge by the state of his own duty to his child, which he has wholly
failed to perform, is an imprisonment of the child as against his parental right in it."
Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wise. 328, 338
(1876). Compare Wisconsin Industrial School for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wisc. 651,
79 N.W. 422 (1899).
241. See generally J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE (1963).
242. R. PICKETr, supra note 58 at 103-04. This is one of many interesting parallels

between the temperance movement and juvenile reform or child saving movement.
Compare J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE (1963) with R. PICKETT, supra note 58.
243. See, e.g., MICHIGAN PUBLIC ACTS OF 1889, No. 189 P. 219, ILL-TREATED
CHILDREN §§ 12 First, 14.
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The morality of the dominant classes was also a part of the child
protection package. Most of the statutes were, and are, omnibus
compendiums of opprobrius epithets. " ' In several cases majority
definitions of morality were used to institutionalize children. In New
York a girl who was allegedly "found in the company of Mary Ryan,
who is a reputed prostitute" was immured, for a time, in the
Protectory;1 5 and two small children who were allegedly "found
improperly exposed and neglected by their parents, and in a reputed
house of assignation and prostitution and without proper

guardianship" were committed to a missionary order.246 Immoral
parents not only lost custody of their children, but they were also
denied the chance to "rehabilitate" themselves. Thus, an adultress and
petty thief lost her children, was forbidden from visiting them, and
evidently was not even told where they were. 4 The child savers were
interested in rescuing the children, not in redeeming parents; and
neither sparing the public pocketbook nor improving the parents was
deemed of such importance. 28 The state's role as guardian of
endangered children thus came to encompass the idea that the state
244. See the collection of current definitions, Simpson, The Unfit Parent. 39 U.
DET. L.J. 347, 366-67 (1962):

Typical provisions are: abandonment; lack of proper parental care
through the fault of the parent; neglect or refusal to provide proper or
necessary subsistence, education, or medical care; refusal or neglect to
provide special care necessary for a particular mental or physical condition
of the child; disreputable lodging, especially a house of prostitution;
association of the child with vagrant, vicious, and immoral persons;
permission for the child to engage in an occupation dangerous to life and
limb or one that is illegal or injurious to health or morals of the child or
others; home unfit because of neglect, cruelty, or depravity of the parents;
violation of child labor laws; violation of school attendance laws;
subjection of the child to cruel and inhuman treatment; dependency of the
child on the public for support; custody in controversy; habitual begging
and receiving alms; giving entertainments, playing musical instruments on
the streets or in public places for pay; home unsuitable for reasons other
than poverty; parents habitually drunken; parents generally unfit; and
neglect.
245. People ex rel. Van Riper v. New York Catholic Protectory, 106 N.Y. 604, 610
13 N.E. 435, 437 (1887).
246. People v. Giles, 152 N.Y. 136, 138, 46 N.E. 326 (1897); see also Nunn v.State,
55 Ind. App. 37, 103 N.E. 439 (1913) (crime of contributing to neglect on similar facts).
247. In re Diss Debar, 3 N.Y.S. 667 (1889); see also the quotation from Dunmain v.
Gwynne, supra note 124.
248. FOLKS, supra note 47, at 101-102. The private institutions received a per capita
maintenance from the state and volume was necessary to hold down unit costs. Id. at 18788.
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could assume custody of the children of a parent who was
unconventional by dominant standards."
Poverty, the use of alcohol, and "immoral" behavior were all

reference points which the controlling groups in the nineteenth century
selected to define others as abnormal and themselves as normal. The
remedy was to inculcate conventional mores by parting the malleable

children from their unregenerate parents and raising the children by
dominant standards3m

Thus, the reformers anticipated Shaw's

comments: "You can exterminate any human class not only by
summary violence but by bringing up its children to be different" and
"[tihere is nothing that can be changed more completely than human
nature when the job is taken in hand early enough."' The reformers
were unable to extirpate pauperism and abnormality because of the

parsimoniousness of the legislatures; instead of being moulded and
improved, the children of the state were regularly abused, mistreated

and warped.
Perhaps the religious issue is the best example of the conventional
reaction to people who were different. In commenting on the O'Connell

case, Justice Redfield said of the protective statutes:
We do not indeed suppose that the persons mainly
instrumental in getting up these things in the country really intend
them for their children, or indeed in the present case for the
249. Cf. Smith v. Wilson, 269 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
250. The Chicago Juvenile Court Act proclaimed as its purpose:
That the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as
nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents, and in all cases
where it can properly be done the child be placed in an improved family
home and become a member of the family by legal adoption or otherwise.
LAWS OF ILLINOIS, 41 G.A. JUVENILE COURTS 131, § 21 at 137 (1899). This may have,
as Fox asserts, "codified the shift from congregate to family penology." Fox, supra note
52, at 1212. First someone must explain to me what "family penology" is. The true
significance of the act is, I believe, that it shows the growth of governmental power, the
proclivity of reformers to social control and the domineering attitude of the upper classes
towards the lower classes and those with different life styles. It is interesting to note that
the first reported Illinois juvenile court case [Lindsey v. Lindsey, 257 Ill.
328, 100 N.E.
892 (1913)] did not concern a potential criminal. The child was held by the lower court to
be endangered simply because his mother was a votary of a screwball religion; and there
seems to have been no objective danger of harm. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed on
the facts while upholding the statute. PAULSEN, Juvenile Courts Family Courts and the
Poor Man, LAW OF THE POOR, 370, 383-85 (J. tenBroek ed. 1966).
251. See H. JAMES, CHILDREN IN TROUBLE: A NATIONAL SCANDAL, 33, 35,268, see
especially the ironic twist of theparenspatriaedoctrine at 65 (1969-1970); see the study of
Junior Village, supra note 233.
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children of Protestant parents, to any large extent. We cannot
disguise to ourselves that these things do have an ominous squint
towards the children of Roman Catholic parents, and of the

multitudes of poor emigrants yearly coming to our shores, most of
whom are of that faith. We cannot but feel that the real animus of
these enactments is but poorly disguised under the general terms
adopted ...

We all very properly look to the natural operation of such
provisions, and the persons they will naturally reach, in order to

determine the motive of those who introduce them. '21

The good judge was both right and wrong. He correctly observed
that reform was initially impelled, at least in part, by a fear of
immigrants. 5 3 Fear of Catholicism and irreligion activated the

reformers; evidenced by the fact that Protestant instruction was a part
of the religion at the House of Refuge.2 54 Justice Redfield commented
after O'Connellthat a Catholic "child cannot be torn from home and
immured in a Protestant prison, for ten or more years, and trained in
what he regards a heretical and deadly faith, to the destruction of his
own soul." z The O'Connelldecision did not stop this practice.
This problem is a part of the American reaction to immigration in
the nineteenth century, middle class fear of the working classes, rural
fear of urbanization and Protestant fear of Catholicism. It is not an
unfair generalization to say that the child savers were middle class,
Protestant and infatuated with rural as opposed to urban virtues. 5 8
Frequently, they did their good deeds through private organizations. 257
The absence of adequate in-home assistance and the prevailing attitude
toward the lower class homes precluded modern income support, and
required the removal of wayward, neglected and destitute children from
their parents' home. 58 The legislatures in many cases did not
appropriate capital funds for building and the child saving work was
frequently carried on by per capita subsidies to private institutions215
with varying public control over commitment, institutional
252. 19 AM. L. REG. 372, 374-75 (1870).

253. R. PicKETT, supra note 58, at 36.
254. Id. at 112, 122, 143; see also Fox, supra note 52, at 1195.
255. 19 AM. L. REG. 372, 373-74 (1870).

256. See, e.g., the rhetoric of Charles Loring Brace and his group found in I G.
ABBOTT, supra note 38, at 133-63, and THURSTON, supra note 45, at 92-160.
257. FOLKS, supra note 47, at 30-36, 69, 71-72, 98-103. For a sanguine analysis of
their possible motives see PLATr, supra note 185, at 75-152.
258. FOLKS, supra note 47, at 101-02.
259. Id. at 83-86 (9 states). See also 2 G. ABBOTr, supra note 38, at 73-111.
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housekeeping and release. 6 State control of religious education",' and
statements to religious bodies can be observed. 2 2 In addition parents

lost control over the religious education of their children.2 3 So strong
was the commitment to child saving that the courts ignored everything
else. Child saving was a good thing, and as reformers often have, the

child savers ignored Shaw's dictim: "there is no more dangerous
mistake than the mistake of supposing that we cannot have too much of

a good thing." '
SUMMARY

Earlier, the juvenile court was hailed as revolutionary. 65 However,
closer and more thorough studies have concluded that the Chicago
juvenile court of 1899 was the product of conservative political groups
and a consolidation of legislative precedent from Illinois and
elsewhere. 26 The legislation 267 allowed the State upon complaint by
260. FOLKS, supra note 49, at 75-78. Public officials were not even allowed to visit
the "Chicago Industrial School for Girls" without permission of the presiding Bishop.
Cook County v. Chicago Industrial School, 125, Ill. 540, 550-51, 558, 18 N.E. 183

(1888).
261. Fox, supra note 52, at 1195.
262. See State ex rel. Nev. Orphan's Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882)
declaring this practice illegal under the state constitution. In Illinois, the subsidies were
declared to be illegal, Cook County v. Chicago Industrial School, 125 Ill. 540, 18 N.E.
183 (1888), but government institutions were not forthcoming and the use of sectarian
institutions did not cease. PLATr, supra note 185, at 116. The Illinois Supreme Court
recanted its earlier position. See Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School, 280 I1l. 613, 117
N.E. 735 (1917); Dunn v. Addision School, 281 Ill. 352, 117 N.E. 993 (1917); Trost v.
Ketteler Training School, 282 I11.504, 118 N.E. 743 (1918). It is interesting to contrast
the sedulous protection from sectarian influences extended to non-pauper children in
public schools. See People v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910). In
New York the problem was not handled much better but with a more eager sophistry. See
Sargeant v. Rochester Board of Education, 177 N.Y. 317, 69 N.E. 722 (1904); People ex
rel. Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum Society v. Board of Education, 13 Barb. 400
(1851). Subsidies are permissible under prevailing interpretation. Cases collected
ANNOT., 81 A.L.R.2d 1309 (1962) and later case services.
263. Whalen v. Olmstead, 61 Conn. 263, 23 A. 964 (1881). See the interesting twists
in Puinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907) where a declaration that a
child was to be raised in her parent's faith resulted in tragedy to all concerned except the
state. For the use of the protective statutes to harass people with unconventional life
styles and religion, see the facts in Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913)
which has a happy ending but disturbing implications. See also In re Black, 3 Utah 2d
315, 283, P.2d 887, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 923 (1955) (religious polygamy).
264. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, PREFACE TO GETTING MARRIED, 317 at 333; 4

COMPLETE PLAYS WITH PREFACES (1963).
265. Jerome Frank, Preface to, A. KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN, XI (1953).
266. A. Plait, supra note 185, at 135, Fox, supra note 52, at 1229-30.
267. LAWS OF ILLINOIS, 41 G.A., Juvenile Courts at 131-37 (188Q
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"any reputable person" to institutionalize and possibly apprentice or
consent to the adoption of any dependent, neglected or delinquent child.
There was nothing new in any of these ideas, and there was no sharp
break from tradition."' 8 The statutory definitions of dependency and
neglect were from the poor law; the population at risk was poor;
commitment to institutions was an improvement over, but a descendent
from, commitment to poorhouses; apprenticeship was the expedient
available to overseers of the poor from the earliest times; and adoption,
a nineteenth century addition, reveals the growth of state power as
much as the development of state benevolence.
The authorized version of the juvenile courts' history is somewhat
as follows. The juvenile court was a successor to chancery. From the
earliest times, equity has protected infants who were dependent or
neglected under parenspatriae.
Under the English common law it was recognized that "the
care of all infants is lodged in the king as parenspatriaeand by the
kind this care is delegated to the Court of Chancery." In
protecting neglected and dependent children chancery courts used
what are called "equitable powers" the essential ideas of which
are flexibility, guardianship, and a balancing of interests in the
general welfare, with a view to getting a fairer result
than could be
2
obtained by applying the older, more rigid rules. 11

The juvenile court was a statutory expression of these impulses. This
interpretation contains several errors. First, the courts of equity
protected the feudal arrangements and property rather than the
"dependent and neglected;" and there is no evidence that chancery ever
protected the dependent and neglected as they were statutorily
0 Second, if the analysis suggested
defined.2Y
herein is accurate, the

juvenile courts' protective jurisdiction was a direct descendent of the
poor laws, more particularly those which allowed the state to
apprentice a pauper's children without the parents' consent. Those
268. See the legislative scheme in exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 10 (Pa. 1838); House
of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio 197,201-02 (1881); In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482,486-87,53
N.E. 676 (1899); all operating to "protect" the impoverished the wayward and the
endangered. In Michigan before the turn of the century a child who was dependent,
(MICHIGAN COMPILED LAWS of 1897 § 2023), delinquent (Id. § 2261), or ill-treated (Id.

§

5563) could be taken from his parents and placed in a public institution (Id. §§ 2025,

2261, 5563 § 14 Second) and was available for apprenticeship or adoption (Id. §§ 2034,
2263, 2264).
269. F. SUSSMAN AND BAUM, TnE LAW OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 5-6 (1968).

270. See Cogan, supra note 14; and the Illinois legislation, supra note 267.
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statutes came to require more rigorous procedure as commitments were

gradully taken from the poor law officials and given to judicial officers,
but at the same time the definitions were broadened and the effect of

intervention became more serious. The rubric should not be allowed to
conceal the facts. Acting under the police power to regulate and
camouflaging its action by chanting parenspatriae, the state assumed

the power to dissolve for a time, and later permanently, the ties between
impoverished parents and their children. And third, it is wrong to say

that there was any flexibility or balancing of interests in making these
decisions. The statutes exacerbated the vulnerability of a class of
people; and because of the pourous and opaque definitions and the
flimsy procedures the state was allowed to interpose pretty much its
will. The power of equity over the estates and sometimes the custody of

children, rather than a precedent, was used as a legal argument, after
the fact, to make palatable the poor law practice of separating children

from their parentsY11Some of the proponents of the juvenile court were
merely sappy and wrong headed;

2

others were dangerous;213 all were,

in a sense, wrong.
271. Cf. Tappen, Approaches to Children With Problems,JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD,
146-50 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1961).
272. See THE CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE COURT (J. Addams ed. 1925)
(collection of lyrical encomiums); H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1927); 2 G. ABBOTT, supra note 38, at 138-51, 362-51, 362-65 (Charles Loring Brace).
The reform impulse of many is summarized by this quotation from Dickens:
"But even if he has been wicked," pursued Rose, "think how young
he is; think that he may never have known a mother's love or the comfort
of a home, that ill usage and blows, or the want of bread, may have driven
him to herd with men who have forced him to guilt. Aunt, dear aunt, for
mercy's sake, think of this before you let them drag this sick child to a
prison, which in any case must be the grave of all his chances of
amendment. Oh! as you love me, and know that I have never felt the want
of parents in your goodness and affection, but that I might have done so,
and might have been equally helpless and unprotected with this poor child,
have pity upon him before it is too late!"
C. DICKENS, OLIVER TwiST, Ch. XXX at 264 (Signet ed.)
273. Mack, THE JUVENILE COURT, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909) "We are familiar
with the conception that the state is the higher or the ultimate parent of all of the
dependents within its borders." Id. at 104. "Most of the children who came before the
court are, naturally, the children of the poor. In many cases the parents are foreigners,
frequently unable to speak English, and without understanding of American methods and
views." Id. at 116-17. "Seated at a desk with the child at his side, where he can on
occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing
none of his judicial dignity, will gain immensely in the effectivenss of his work." Id. at 20.
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It would be foolish to argue that the juvenile court, once
established, brought no useful changes. New and salutary ideas about
the causes of crime, penology, probation, parole and child welfare
services have played a large part in its development."' Apprenticeship
has died out as a dispositional alternative, and no one could seriously
argue that the modern juvenile court is using its neglect and dependency
jurisdiction to take babies from poor familes and then in turn to give
them up for adoption to the richY5 In addition, the mother's pension,
the beginning of modern income maintenance, originated in the
Chicago Juvenile Court, due to the efforts of a judge who disliked
committing "dependent children" to institutions because of the
poverty of their parents. 6
Even so, the temporal juvenile court and parenspatriaein practice
are not all they have been said to be; the story is mostly one of missed
opportunities. The concept of patenspatriaewas borrowed from equity
I wonder how Justice Redfield would have reacted to that statement. See 19 AMt. L. REo.
372 (1871). In Meyer v. Nebraska the Supreme Court said:
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law
which should provide: "That the wives of our guardians are to be common,
and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own
child nor any child his parent . . . . The proper officers will take the
offspring of the good parents to the penn or fold, and there they will deposit
them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring
of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put
away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be." In order to
submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the
males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and
training to official guardians. Although such measures have been
deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the
relation between individual and State were wholly different from those
upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any
legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a State
without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.
262 U.S. 390, 301-02 (1922). Holmes dissented without mentioning the parent-child
relationship. Id. at 412-13. Compare the dissent in In re Kelly, 152 Mass. 432-40,25 N.E.
615, 616 (1890) in which Holmes dissented. See also Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District, 393 U.S. 503,511-15 (1969).
274. F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLINE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE JUVENILE COURT AND
THE LIMITS OF JUVENILE JUsTICE, 43-61 (1964); A KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE (1967).
275. tenBroek, Family Law, supra note 32, Il at 679 (1964). Johnson v. Horace
Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 241 S.2d 588, 591 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (dicta); but see Savery v.
Eddy, 242 Iowa 822,45 N.W.2d 72, rehearing48 N.W.2d 230 (1951).
276. 2 G. ABBOTT, THE CHILD AND THE STATE, 230 (1938); LAWS OF ILLINOIS 1911
at 126-27.
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and misapplied in statutory poverty and protective proceedings. In the
process, it took on a new meaning which was nearly synonymous with
the general power of government to regulate. Thus, in analyzing state
power over minors and inter-family relationships today, parenspatriae
adds nothing, except that in the twentieth century it is a nice way to beg
a questionf 7
History is important, for, in Holmes' words, "the first step
toward an enlightened skepticism, that is, toward a deliberate
reconsideration of the worth of those rules," is knowledge of the origin
and original scope of terms and institutions. But knowledge without
action is otiose: "When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the
plain and in the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just
what is his strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is
either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal." z 1
The juvenile court is now on the plainY9
277. Cogan, supra note 14, at 147, n.139 at 173.
278. Holmes, The Pathof the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,469 (1897).
279. LAW OF TH POOR, 370 (J. tenBroek ed. 1966).
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